Copyright\u27s Mercantilist Turn by Lunney,, Glynn S., Jr.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 6
Fall 2014
Copyright's Mercantilist Turn
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright's Mercantilist Turn, 42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 95 (2017) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol42/iss1/6
COPYRIGHT‘S MERCANTILIST TURN 
GLYNN S. LUNNEY, JR. 
ABSTRACT 
 Over the last twenty years, arguments for broader copyright have taken an increasingly 
mercantilist turn. Unable to establish that broader copyright will lead to more or better 
original works, as the Constitution and the traditional economic framework require, propo-
nents have begun arguing for broader copyright on the basis of revenue and jobs. Rampant 
unauthorized copying is theft or piracy, proponents insist, depriving copyright owners of 
revenue and destroying jobs. Whether or not it leads to more or better works, broader copy-
right will increase revenue to copyright owners and thus increase employment in the copy-
right industries. This increased employment, on its own, justifies broader copyright, or so 
proponents contend. In this Article, I critically reexamine this argument and show that it 
is empty. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Over the last twenty years, justifications for broader copyright 
protection have taken an increasingly mercantilist turn. In the recent 
debates over the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) and the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), proponents did not seriously argue 
that these measures would enhance welfare by encouraging the pro-
duction of more and better works of authorship. Rather, they argued 
that these bills would increase revenues to domestic copyright own-
ers and thereby create jobs.1 This shift from neoclassical welfare eco-
nomics to mercantilist2 justifications for policy is not unique to PIPA 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
 2. The term ―mercantilist‖ or ―mercantilism‖ has been applied to several different 
political or economic approaches. Originally, it referred to approaches that sought to main-
tain a favorable balance of trade in order to bring gold and silver into an economy while 
removing it from other nations‘ economies. Over time, however, this emphasis on the mon-
ey supply diminished, and mercantilism came to refer to a collusive relationship between 
government and mercantile interests where, in exchange for paying levies and taxes to 
support the nation-state, government would enact policies to protect business interests 
against competition. See ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, MERCANTILISM 
AS A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY: ECONOMIC REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981); 
ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIZED ECONOMIES: MONARCHY, 
MONOPOLY, AND MERCANTILISM (1997); Elise S. Brezis, Mercantilism, in THE OXFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 484 (2003) (―[Adam] Smith‘s second criticism of mer-
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and SOPA, however. Rather, it has become a defining feature of 
United States trade policy with respect to copyright and intellectual 
property, more generally, over the last few decades. Moving away 
from the tenets of free trade, trade policy in the intellectual property 
arena has sought increasingly to protect domestic industries from 
foreign competition and to ensure thereby more revenue for and more 
jobs in those industries within the United States. 
 This switch from neoclassical welfare economics to mercantilism 
is, in one sense, entirely understandable. To justify broadening copy-
right under neoclassical welfare economics, proponents would need to 
establish three propositions: first, for any given work of authorship, 
broader copyright would lead to more revenue for that work than 
would narrower copyright; second, the prospect of such increased 
revenue would lead individuals to devote additional resources to, and 
hence create, more or better works of authorship; and third, society 
would value such more or better works more highly than the alterna-
tive uses to which the resources would otherwise have been devoted. 
While the first proposition might seem self-evident, the second and 
third certainly are not and as it turns out, establishing any of these 
propositions, let alone all three, has proven extremely difficult.  
 With respect to the second proposition, for example, for hundreds 
of years copyright has relied on the simple, yet fundamental, premise 
that more revenue for copyright owners means more and better orig-
inal works of authorship. Yet, the relationship between revenue and 
creative output is not so straightforward. Consider the music indus-
try. As various popular press accounts have repeatedly touted, record 
sales have fallen sharply since Napster started the file-sharing ball 
rolling.3 In 1999, record sales, whether in physical or electronic for-
mat, stood at $20.4 billion (in constant 2012 dollars).4 In 2012, such 
sales amounted to just over $7 billion.5 The record industry attributes 
this decline to unauthorized consumer copying, file sharing, or in 
their preferred parlance, ―piracy‖ or ―content theft.‖ Empirical stud-
ies dispute this.6 Nevertheless, while the role unauthorized copying 
                                                                                                                  
cantilism was that mercantilist policies did not emerge from a national goal, but rather 
from the interest of merchants and manufacturers in retaining their monopolies—in other 
words, Smith viewed mercantilism as a rent-seeking doctrine.‖).  
 3. For a discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 82-92. 
 4. Shipment Database, RIAA, https://www.riaa.com/keystatistics.php?content_ 
selector=research-shipment-database-overview (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (after subscrib-
ing as a member, select shipment data from year 1973 through 2013 to download data). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Sudip Bhattacharjee, Ram D. Gopal, Kaveepan Lertwachara, James R. 
Marsden & Rahul Telang, The Effect of Digital Sharing Technologies on Music Markets: A 
Survival Analysis of Albums on Ranking Charts, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1359, 1360 (2007) (finding 
that file sharing has no overall effect on length of time song spends on charts); Ram D. 
Gopal, Sudip Bhattacharjee & G. Lawrence Sanders, Do Artists Benefit from Online Music 
Sharing?, 79 J. BUS. 1503, 1503 (2006) (finding that students with faster Internet connec-
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has played in this decline remains unclear, the decline itself cannot 
be disputed. 
 Yet, regardless of whatever may have caused this decline, we have 
not seen a corresponding fall in the production of new music. Three 
empirical studies have examined music output since Napster opened 
its doors in 1999, and all three found that music output has contin-
ued to grow.7 In my own study, I use regression analysis to account 
for other factors, such as declining costs, and show that the decline in 
revenue was associated with an increase in high quality music out-
put.8 Reduced revenue was associated with fewer new artists, as cop-
yright‘s traditional economic account suggests. However, the same 
reduction in revenue was also associated with increased output from 
existing artists. As I predicted in 2001,9 it appears that file sharing 
has reduced the excess incentives that our existing copyright laws 
would have otherwise provided for our most popular artists and au-
thors. Facing reduced revenue from any given song, our most popular 
artists have chosen to create and disseminate more songs in order to 
reach their desired income and standard of living. Moreover, because 
the increased output from existing artists exceeded the decreased 
output from having fewer new artists, the reduction in revenue that 
has occurred in the music industry since file sharing began has been 
                                                                                                                  
tions sample more and that sampling increases the propensity to purchase authorized cop-
ies); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: 
An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1-2 (2007) (finding that unauthorized down-
loads do not reduce authorized purchases); Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, Why the 
Music Industry May Gain from Free Downloading: The Role of Sampling, 24 INT‘L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 907, 912 (2006), available at http:www.sciencedirect.com/science/ 
article/pii/S0167718705001682# (using a multi-variable monopoly model to postulate that 
file sharing increases sales); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C‟s: Music 
Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49 
J.L. & ECON. 29, 29-32 (2006) (finding that five unauthorized downloads substitute for a 
single authorized purchase in their sample); Birgitte Andersen & Marion Frenz, The Im-
pact of Music Downloads and P2P File-Sharing on the Purchase of Music in Canada 22, 
(Dynamics of Insts. and Mkts. in Europe Working Papers on Intellectual Prop. Rights, 
Working Paper No. 82, 2008), available at http:www.dime-eu.org/working-papers/ 
wp14?page=1 (finding that file sharing increases sales: twelve additional downloads were 
associated with additional 0.44 CD purchases); Tatsuo Tanaka, Does File Sharing Reduce 
CD Sales?: A Case of Japan 0 (Inst. of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi Univ., Working 
Paper No. 05-08, 2004), available at http://www.iir.hit-u.ac.jp/archive/event/WP05-
08tanaka.pdf  (finding that file sharing has no effect on sales).  
 7. See Christian Handke, Digital Copying and the Supply of Sound Recordings, 24 
INFO. ECON. & POL‘Y 15 (2012); Joel Waldfogel, Copyright Protection, Technological 
Change, and the Quality of New Products: Evidence from Recorded Music Since Napster, 55 
J.L. & ECON. 715 (2012); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Empirical Copyright: A Case Study of File 
Sharing and Music Output 4 (Tulane U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-2, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2372630. 
 8. Lunney, supra note 7. 
 9. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copy-
right, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 890-92 (2001). 
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associated with a net increase in the production of new hit songs,  
ceteris paribus.  
 Contrary to popular expectations, then, file sharing seems to have 
had a positive net impact on the production of original works of mu-
sic, and it seems to have had that effect precisely because it reduced 
revenue to copyright owners. Given that the Constitution and Su-
preme Court opinions plainly state that copyright‘s purpose is not to 
maximize copyright owners‘ revenue, but ―[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science,‖10 there would seem to be no rational basis for measures, 
such as SOPA and PIPA, designed to reverse the digital revolution 
and curtail file sharing and other forms of consumer copying.  
 Recognizing the difficulty and, perhaps the futility, of attempting 
to justify such measures under the traditional economic and constitu-
tional framework, proponents of broader copyright have sought to 
reframe the debate. Rather than attempt to establish that broader 
copyright enhances welfare or increases the production of copyright-
ed works, proponents of broader copyright have argued instead that 
broader copyright will generate more revenue for copyright owners 
and, in turn, more jobs in the copyright industries. While this alter-
native argument has some superficial appeal, in large part, that ap-
peal arises because the jobs argument nicely complements the tradi-
tional ―more and better works‖ justification. With broader copyright, 
not only can we increase creative output, but we can also create more 
jobs and ensure the proverbial starving artist a livable wage—all 
with one stroke of our legislative pen. Despite this superficial attrac-
tiveness, the real question is whether the jobs argument can justify 
broader copyright on its own, independent of copyright‘s traditional 
justification. In other words, even if broader copyright meant no in-
crease in creative output—or as is more likely today given copyright‘s 
extreme breadth, a measurable decrease in creative output—can we 
nevertheless justify broader copyright on the grounds that it will cre-
ate more jobs in the copyright industries?  
 We cannot. This attempt to refocus the debate on revenue and jobs 
represents a classic mercantilist ploy and, as Adam Smith estab-
lished more than three hundred years ago, is seriously flawed.11 
While creating jobs seems like a good and desirable role for govern-
                                                                                                                  
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (―The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of au-
thors, but ‗[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.‘ ‖ (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8)); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (―The im-
mediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‗author‘s‘ creative labor. 
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general pub-
lic good.‖); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (―The copy-
right law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.‖). 
 11. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson 1848). 
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ment, particularly in today‘s economy, governments do not, in the 
end, create jobs. Needs, wants, and desires do. Through regulations, 
taxes and spending, and other government action, governments can 
shift jobs from one sector of the economy to another, by encouraging 
the satisfaction of some desires, while discouraging the satisfaction of 
others. As a general rule, however, over the long run, creating jobs in 
one sector, through government action, necessarily entails losing jobs 
elsewhere.12 
 Consider the argument that broader copyright creates jobs. For 
broader copyright to create jobs in the copyright industries, it must 
increase revenue to copyright owners. Yet, for the copyright indus-
tries to receive more revenue, consumers must pay more for works of 
authorship. Broader copyright, after all, does not generate revenue 
from thin air. It has to come from somewhere. If consumers have to 
pay more for works of authorship, they will have less to spend on 
everything else. Thus, more revenue for the copyright industries nec-
essarily means less revenue for other sectors of the economy. If more 
revenue for copyrighted works means more jobs for the copyright in-
dustries, presumably less revenue everywhere else means fewer jobs 
elsewhere in the economy. 
 In that sense, the jobs argument for SOPA and PIPA or for broad-
er copyright, more generally, represents a perfect example of Frederic 
Bastiat‘s Broken Window Fallacy.13 Writing in 1850, Bastiat empha-
sized the need to account in economics and politics both for that 
which is seen and that which is not seen. (―Ce qu‟on voit et ce qu‟on ne 
voit pas.‖) When a boy breaks a shopkeeper‘s window, the shopkeeper 
must employ a glazier to fix it. If we focus solely on the employment 
of the glazier—that which is seen—then one might conclude that the 
government should hire children to go around breaking windows in 
order to increase the employment of glaziers in the economy. Howev-
                                                                                                                  
 12. As Professor Machlup has explained in the patent context: 
It is easy to conceive of the possibility that such allocation [of productive re-
sources to invention] is too meager. But can there ever be too much? Is not 
more research and development always better than less? Is it possible that too 
much is devoted to the inventive effort of the Nation? This depends on what it 
is that is curtailed when inventive activity is expanded. More of one thing must 
mean less of another, and the question is, what it is of which there will be 
less. . . . Whenever permanent economic policies—not just war or depression 
measures—are discussed, sound economics must start from the principle that 
no activity can be promoted without encroaching on some other activity. More 
of one service or product must mean less of another. 
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85th CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: STUDY NO. 15, 45-
46 (Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter PATENT STUDY] (primarily written by Fritz Machlup). 
 13. FREDERIC BASTIAT, That Which Is Seen and that Which Is Not Seen, in ESSAYS ON 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 72 (David A. Wells trans., N.Y., G. P. Putnam‘s Sons 1877) (1850). 
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er, as Bastiat cautioned, we must also account for that which is not 
seen. Because the shopkeeper had to spend his money on the glazier, 
he could not spend that money elsewhere: on new shoes or a new 
book for his library. When we account for this lost spending else-
where—that which is not seen—we find that the broken window gen-
erates no net stimulus to employment. The glazier earns more; but 
whoever would have received that money but for the broken win-
dow—whether cobbler, bookseller, or another—earns exactly that 
much less. 
 The mercantilist argument for broader copyright suffers from 
much the same fallacy. It urges us to focus solely on that which is 
seen—the increased revenue and enhanced employment broader cop-
yright brings to the copyright industries. It asks us to ignore that 
which is not seen—the reduced revenue and diminished employment 
broader copyright brings to every other sector of the economy. Once 
we account for both that which is seen and that which is not seen, we 
find the mercantilist argument for broader copyright entirely empty. 
Just as the broken window generates no net stimulus for the econo-
my, so too does broader copyright. Whatever increased revenue 
broader copyright generates for the copyright industries, it simply 
takes from elsewhere in the economy.  
 Of course, arguing for broader copyright in order to increase the 
employment of authors and artists is not precisely the same as argu-
ing for a government policy urging children to break windows in or-
der to increase the employment of glaziers. Breaking windows de-
stroys something of value; encouraging authorship creates something 
of value—more or better works of authorship. Yet, this difference, 
while important, does not diminish the relevance of Bastiat‘s para-
ble.14 Even though authorship is a productive activity, we still must 
account for that which is not seen. But for broader copyright, there 
would have been more revenue for and hence more employment in 
other sectors of the economy, and presumably that alternative em-
ployment would have been productive as well. Although the alterna-
tive employment would not create more or better works of author-
ship, it would create something else of value to society. The question 
thus becomes whether we would value the additional works of au-
thorship that we assume broader copyright will bring forth more 
                                                                                                                  
 14. While the Broken Window parable is the first and perhaps most well-known in 
Bastiat‘s essay, he actually presents a number of examples and, as we shall see, addresses 
this sort of trade-off directly, particularly in his section entitled ―Theatres and Fine Arts.‖ 
See infra text accompanying notes 101-11.  
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than or less than the something else that we would have had but for 
broadening copyright.15  
 By so accounting for that which is not seen, we find that the mer-
cantilist jobs mantra is not a shortcut; it does not and cannot avoid 
the hard question of valuing alternative uses of the available re-
sources. To justify broader copyright on the grounds that it will cre-
ate more jobs, proponents still must show that those copyright jobs 
produce something that is more valuable to society than the goods or 
services that the alternative jobs would have produced. While 
phrased slightly differently, this is essentially the same proposition 
proponents of broader copyright have been unable to establish under 
the traditional economic and constitutional framework.  
 Demonstrating both a loss of revenue to copyright owners and a 
loss of associated jobs in the copyright sectors of the economy is not, 
therefore, sufficient to justify broader copyright, whether in the form 
of PIPA and SOPA or otherwise. Labeling the behavior at issue as 
―piracy‖ or ―content theft‖ cannot provide the necessary justification 
either. The only way to justify further government intervention is for 
the proponents of broader copyright to demonstrate that the wide-
spread consumer copying and distribution that the Internet has 
made possible has: (1) led to a reduction in the expected revenue as-
sociated with any given work; (2) that this reduction in expected rev-
enue has led to a reduced output of works of authorship; and (3) that 
the lost output in copyrighted works would have been more valuable 
than the alternative output elsewhere in the economy. However, pro-
ponents of broader copyright have neither made this showing nor 
does it appear that they can. Arguing that broader copyright increas-
es revenue to the copyright industries and thereby leads to more em-
ployment in those industries proves nothing all.   
 This article explores these issues in turn. Section II begins with a 
review of the arguments proponents advanced in support of PIPA and 
SOPA and notes the emphasis on lost revenue and jobs. In Section 
III, we examine the neoclassical welfare approach to defining the op-
timal scope of copyright. As part of this discussion, we take a look at 
how digital technology has changed the music industry and examine 
in detail the effects consumer copying has had on creative output. In 
Section IV, we turn to a critique of the mercantilist approach to copy-
right. Taking Bastiat‘s lessons to heart, Section IV demonstrates that 
revenue and jobs alone are not a sufficient justification for govern-
ment intervention absent associated net welfare losses. It also 
demonstrates that pursuing a copyright policy that attempts to max-
                                                                                                                  
 15. As Professor Baxter has explained: ―This is the classic economic criterion for opti-
mal allocation.‖ William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monop-
oly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 268 n.7 (1966).  
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imize revenue for and employment by the copyright industries inevi-
tably leads to welfare losses.  
II.   ILLUSTRATING THE MERCANTILIST TURN 
 On January 18, 2012, democracy happened in the United States. 
Until that point, it appeared that SOPA and PIPA were headed for 
passage.16 Following the lead of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
which had passed PIPA in May 2011, the Chairman of the House Ju-
diciary Committee, Representative Lamar Smith (R-Tex), introduced 
SOPA on October 26, 2011, with an initial group of twelve bipartisan 
co-sponsors. According to its sponsors, the bill was intended to shut 
down foreign websites that made available to United States consum-
ers unauthorized copies of copyrighted works (described as ―rogue‖ 
websites, in keeping with the view that labels alone suffice to make 
plain wrongdoing). It did so both directly, by providing for court or-
ders that would require Internet service providers to block access to 
such websites17 (the so-called DNS blocking remedy) and indirectly by 
providing for court orders that would bar: (i) online advertisers and 
payment facilitators from conducting business with such sites; and 
(ii) search engines from listing such sites.18 The House Judiciary 
Committee held an initial hearing on November 16, 2011, featuring 
four witnesses who supported the bill and one, Katherine Oyama, 
Google‘s Copyright Counsel, who opposed it.  
 Despite proponents‘ attempts to limit testimony on the issues,19 
opposition to and concerns about the bill began to mount. As a result, 
                                                                                                                  
 16. For example, in the second day of mark-up hearings on SOPA, Representative Issa 
(Calif.), an opponent of SOPA, acknowledged that opponents of SOPA were going to lose. 
Markup of H.R. 3261, Stop Online Piracy Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 112th Cong. 28 (2011) [hereinafter SOPA Markup] (statement of Rep. Issa), available 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/transcript12162011.pdf (―Mr. Chairman, it 
is very clear, we are going to lose here today. No, let me rephrase that, we are going to lose 
eventually, and we are going to lose in the worst possible way. We are going to lose without 
all the facts, we are going to lose without the process being open in the way that I would 
hope it will be in the new year.‖). 
 17. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(c)(2)(A)(i) (2011), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3261ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr3261ih.pdf. 
 18. Id. § 102(c)(2)(B)–(D). 
 19. See SOPA Markup supra note 16, at 82 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), avail-
able at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/transcript12152011.pdf (―I am con-
cerned that when we had the hearing on this bill as far as the DNSSEC provisions were 
concerned, none of the six witnesses were able to address this issue.‖); id. at 88 (statement 
of Rep. Chaffetz) (―I understand that there is a problem, but I worry that this is the wrong 
remedy. I was trying to think of a way to try to describe my concerns with this bill, but 
basically we are going to do surgery on the Internet, and we haven‘t had a doctor in the 
room tell us how we [sic] going to change these organs. We are basically going to reconfig-
ure the Internet and how it is going to work without bringing in the nerds, without bring-
ing in the doctors.‖); id. at 95, 98 (statement of Rep. Lungren) (―One of my problems with 
this bill is we have not had the benefit of technical experts to appear and testify before us, 
and certainly on the same platform. . . . When we had that last hearing, there wasn‘t a 
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Representative Smith introduced an amended version of the bill on 
December 15, 2011.20 Mark-up hearings were then held for two days 
before Congress adjourned. At the end of the December 16th mark-up 
session, Representative Smith stated that he expected ―to resume 
markup at the next earliest practicable day that Congress is in ses-
sion.‖21 By January 16, 2012, the number of cosponsors for SOPA had 
swelled from the initial twelve to thirty-one,22 and Representative 
Smith had scheduled the next mark-up session for January 20th.  
 However, just two days before the scheduled mark-up, on January 
18, 2012, the English Wikipedia, Reddit, and an estimated 7,000 oth-
er smaller websites coordinated a service blackout in order to raise 
awareness on SOPA and PIPA. Together with petition drives and 
other protests, this online activism generated a firestorm like nothing 
Congress had ever seen before—at least on copyright issues. In re-
sponse, on January 20, 2012, Representative Smith cancelled the 
scheduled mark-up hearing and postponed further consideration  
of SOPA.23  
 My focus for now is not on the Internet as a means of overcoming 
the collective action problems that have long plagued the opponents 
of broader copyright:24 it is on the arguments proponents of SOPA 
                                                                                                                  
single person who could answer the technical questions, and they all admitted that, even 
though a couple of them still opined.‖). 
 20. Id. at 9-11.  
 21. Id. at 57.  
 22. See H.R. 3261. 
 23. Press Release, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Statement from Chairman Smith on 
Senate Delay of Vote on PROTECT IP Act (Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Statement from 
Chairman Smith], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ID= 
1B5961D6-9862-3B91-BDD8-54B9ACB377D1. 
 24. As I have explained elsewhere:  
In dealing with the Copyright Act, we should bear in mind that it directly bene-
fits a well-organized special interest group, authors and publishers, at the ex-
pense of a more dispersed group, the public. Given a statuto [sic] with such a 
distribution of benefits and hurdens [sic], public choice theory predicts that 
over time the statute will inevitably come to favor more and more the desires of 
the special interest group at the expense of the more dispersed group. When 
combined with some superficially plausible rationale that can serve to screen 
the legislator‘s motivations, the concentrated group‘s disproportionato [sic] abil-
ity to raise money that can be used—whether in the form of campaign contribu-
tions, bribes, or for expert opinions that back the group‘s position—to convince 
legislators to favor the concentrated group‘s position, has proven unfortunatoly 
[sic] persuasive in convincing our elected representatives to serve the special 
interest at the expense of the general public. That our elected representatives 
have therefore broadened copyright‘s protection to include these additional 
rights provides no assurance that there is adequato [sic] justification for these 
rights. Awarding authors these rights will often be the result of interest group 
pressure, combined with a superficially plausible explanation to cover the legis-
lators‘ actions.  
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and PIPA used to justify their proposals. From the outset, proponents 
of SOPA and PIPA said little about what one might consider the tra-
ditional justifications for broader copyright. In fact, almost nothing at 
all was said about how these ―rogue‖ websites, if not addressed, 
would lead to fewer works of authorship. Certainly, no attempt was 
made to show that not only would fewer works be forthcoming but 
that there would be fewer works than would be socially optimal. Ra-
ther, proponents of SOPA and PIPA emphasized the need for legisla-
tion to protect American jobs.  
 For example, in joining with Representative Smith to introduce 
SOPA, Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Va) issued a press release, 
entitled Goodlatte Introduces Legislation to Protect American Jobs, 
explaining his support for SOPA. Given its title, the basis for his 
support was not surprising: 
 Piracy denies individuals who have invested in the creation and 
production of these goods a return on their investment thus reduc-
ing the incentive to invest in innovative products and new creative 
works. The end result is the loss of American jobs. Estimates indi-
cate that IP theft costs the U.S. economy over $100 billion a year 
and results in the loss of thousands of American jobs.25 
 Similarly, during the November 16th hearing, Michael O‘Leary of 
the Motion Picture Association of America sought to justify enact-
ment of SOPA as follows: 
Fundamentally, this is about jobs. The motion picture and televi-
sion industry supports more than two million American jobs in all 
50 states. The 20 states and Puerto Rico represented by this Com-
mittee are home to 1.7 million American jobs supported by the mo-
tion picture and television industry, including more than 525,000 
direct motion picture and television industry jobs. About 12 per-
cent of those are directly employed in motion picture and television 
production and distribution, jobs paying an average annual salary 
of nearly $79,000. Those are not just the people whose names you 
see on the marquee in front of the theater – they‘re the hard-
working people behind the scenes, from the carpenter who built 
the set, to the costumer and make-up artist who helped bring each 
character to life, to the Foley artist who created the sound effects.26 
                                                                                                                  
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright‟s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 483, 629 n.476 (1996) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 14 (2004); Lunney, supra note 9, at 896-98; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copy-
right Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (2001). 
 25. Press Release, Goodlatte Introduces Legislation to Protect American Jobs (Oct. 27, 
2011), available at goodlatte.house.gov/press_releases/281. 
 26. The “Stop Online Piracy Act”: Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 72 (2011) (statement of Michael P. O‘Leary, Senior Exec. Vice Pres-
ident, Global Policy and External Affairs, on behalf of the Motion Picture Association of 
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 Following the November 16th hearing, another of SOPA‘s co-
sponsors, Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.), reiterated the 
jobs theme in expressing his support for SOPA: 
I have always stood by artists, and it is for this reason that I want 
to see the Stop Online Piracy Act become law. The bill is of vital 
importance to protecting American jobs and artisans, protecting 
the American consumers from dangerous counterfeits, and ensur-
ing the very vitality of American culture.  
. . . . 
We can protect and promote American jobs, perhaps millions of 
them, by getting a bill like this to President Obama‘s desk for his 
signature as soon as possible.27 
 Even when forced to postpone further consideration of SOPA, 
Representative Smith reiterated his support for congressional action 
in this area, on the basis, yet again, of jobs: ―American intellectual 
property industries provide 19 million high-paying jobs and account 
for more than 60 percent of U.S. exports. The theft of America‘s intel-
lectual property costs the U.S. economy more than $100 billion annu-
ally and results in the loss of thousands of American jobs.‖28 
 This emphasis on jobs as a justification for expanded copyright 
protection is not simply a result of our recent recession. In 2007, be-
fore either the recession or SOPA and PIPA had arrived on the scene, 
the copyright industries had already begun using jobs as an argu-
ment to support copyright expansion. In that year, the Institute for 
Policy Innovation released a study purporting to show that for the 
year 2005, piracy accounted for losses to the U.S. economy of $58 bil-
lion in output, over 370,000 jobs, and $2.6 billion in tax revenue.29  
 The emphasis on jobs has also not been restricted to copyright. In 
March 2012, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, together with 
the Economics and Statistics Administration, issued its report on the 
economic impact of intellectual property in the United States.30 Of 
                                                                                                                  
America, Inc.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-
154_71240.PDF. 
 27. Press Release, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Democrats, Conyers: The Stop Online 
Piracy Act Protects American Jobs and Prevents Theft (Nov. 16, 2011), available at 
http://democrats.judiciary.house.gov/press-release/conyers-stop-online-piracy-act-protects-
american-jobs-and-prevents-theft. 
 28. Statement from Chairman Smith, supra note 23. 
 29. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, IPI CTR. FOR TECH. FREEDOM, 
THE TRUE COST OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY: POLICY REPORT 
189, at i (2007), available at http://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/the-true-cost-of-copyright-
industry-piracy-to-the-us-economy.  
 30. REBECCA M. BLANK & DAVID J. KAPPOS, ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & THE U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 
INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS (2012). 
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the report‘s ten principal findings, six related directly to the relation-
ship between intellectual property and jobs, including: 
(1) A finding that IP-intensive industries account directly 
for 27.1 million American jobs, or 18.8 percent of all 
employment in the economy, in 2010; 
(2) A finding that IP-intensive industries account indirectly 
for another 12.9 million supply chain jobs in the United 
States, and thus account directly or indirectly for 27.7 
percent of all jobs in the economy; 
(3) Findings with respect to job creation and job growth in 
the IP-intensive industries; and 
(4) Findings that jobs in IP-intensive industries pay more 
highly than jobs in non-IP-intensive industries.31  
Moreover, it‘s quite clear that this emphasis on jobs as a justification 
for broader intellectual property will not end with the defeat of PIPA 
and SOPA. In July 2012, the Chamber of Commerce issued its cry for 
action on counterfeiting and piracy by reiterating the relationship 
between intellectual property and jobs: ―IP-intensive industries di-
rectly and indirectly support more than 55 million American jobs – 
jobs that pay 30% higher wages than those in other industries – and 
account for $5.8 trillion in national output.‖32 
 Now to some extent, we can readily reject many of these jobs-
based arguments for broader copyright on the relatively simple 
ground that the job loss numbers are as bogus as a three-dollar bill. 
As the GAO explained in a recent report,33 reliable estimates of both 
the revenue losses and the job losses caused by unauthorized copying 
are nearly impossible to generate for two reasons. First, the amount 
of unauthorized copying itself is difficult to estimate.34 Second, the 
rate at which unauthorized copying substitutes for authorized pur-
chases is also difficult to estimate.35  
                                                                                                                  
 31. Id. at vi-viii. 
 32. Unfair Trading Practices Against the U.S.: Intellectual Property Rights Infringe-
ment, Property Expropriation, and Other Barriers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on  
Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 42 (2012) (statement of David Hirschmann on behalf of U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce), available at http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ 
112/75162.pdf.  
 33. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND 
PIRATED GOODS 15-16 (2010) (―Most experts we spoke with and the literature we reviewed 
observed that despite significant efforts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the net 
effect of counterfeiting and piracy on the economy as a whole.‖). 
 34. Id. at 16. 
 35. Id. at 17. 
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 Yet, the purpose of this paper is not to critique the job loss num-
bers that proponents of PIPA and SOPA have offered. Others have 
admirably tackled that topic already.36 The question that I would like 
to address is whether the creation of additional jobs in the copyright 
industries, standing on its own, can ever provide a legitimate, alter-
native basis for copyright expansion. If we knew for certain that 
broadening copyright in a certain way would create some thousands 
of jobs and have no effects other than job creation, would those jobs 
provide a basis for legislative action? To begin to answer that ques-
tion, the next section begins with a review of copyright‘s traditional 
welfare justification, both as a matter of theory and empirically 
through an examination of the impact file sharing has had on the 
music industry. 
III.   COPYRIGHT‘S TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION: 
 THE FEAR OF THE COPYING COMPETITOR AND ITS LIMITS 
 For more than four hundred years, copyright‘s central justification 
has remained essentially unchanged. In the absence of copyright pro-
tection, we fear that competitors will quickly copy new works of au-
thorship, undercut the price for authorized copies and thereby reduce 
the incentive authors will receive for creating and disseminating origi-
nal works. Indeed, in a perfectly competitive world, competitors would 
copy new original works immediately and by offering their copies at a 
price set to cover the competitors‘ marginal costs, would eliminate any 
economic incentive for creating and disseminating an original work. In 
such a world, in the absence of copyright, we might not have too few 
original works but none at all. For more than four hundred years, this 
fear that the incentives for authorship might prove insufficient in the 
absence of copyright has provided copyright‘s central justification. The 
                                                                                                                  
 36. Mike Masnick at Techdirt and Julian Sanchez at the Cato Institute, in particular, 
have thoroughly critiqued many of the numbers SOPA proponents have touted. See, e.g., 
Mike Masnick, A Step by Step Debunking of US Chamber of Commerce‟s Dishonest Stats 
About „Rogue Sites,‟ TECHDIRT (Nov. 30, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20111130/02093116930/step-step-debunking-us-chamber-commerces-dishonest-stats-about-
rogue-sites.shtml; Mike Masnick, Ridiculous: Lamar Smith Basing His Plan to Massively 
Regulate the Internet on False or Misleading Research, TECHDIRT (Dec. 15, 2011, 7:49 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111214/23451317095/ridiculous-lamar-smith-basing-his- 
plan-to-massively-regulate-internet-false-misleading-research.shtml; Julian Sanchez, How 
Copyright Industries Con Congress, CATO INST. (Jan. 3, 2012, 2:07 AM), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/how-copyright-industries-con-congress; Julian Sanchez, SOPA, 
Internet Regulation, and the Economics of Piracy, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 18, 2012, 12:45 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/internet-regulation-and-the-economics-of-piracy; 
see also WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 61-70 (2012) (arguing that projected job 
losses are based on inaccurate data). 
108  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:95 
 
Stationer‘s Guild used it to justify its monopoly over printing as long 
ago as 1586.37 And it remains today, remarkably unchanged.38  
 In the same way, the central limit on copyright has remained 
equally unchanged. Copyright raises the price of books and other 
copyrighted works.39 That higher price simultaneously provides the 
incentive to create original works and limits access to existing works. 
Given the higher price, some consumers will no longer be able to af-
ford authorized copies of an original work. The search for optimal 
copyright is therefore thought to entail a search for the optimal bal-
ance between incentives and access. As Lord Thomas Macaulay ex-
pressed in his speech to the House of Commons in 1841: 
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least ex-
ceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet mo-
nopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the 
evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary 
for the purpose of securing the good.40 
 Or as Professor Landes and Judge Posner more recently offered: 
Copyright protection—the right of the copyright‘s owner to prevent 
others from making copies—trades off the costs of limiting access 
to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the 
                                                                                                                  
 37. The Stationer‘s Guild argued: 
And further if privileges [that is, copyright] be revoked no books at all should 
be printed, within short time, for commonly the first printer is at charge for the 
Author‘s pains, and some other such like extraordinary cost, where an other 
that will print it after him, comes to the Copy gratis, and so may he sell better 
cheaper than the first printer, and then the first printer shall never utter [that 
is, sell] his books. 
2 A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON: 1554—
1640 A.D. at 805 (photo. reprint 1950) (Edward Arber ed., London, privately printed 1875). 
 38.  Almost exactly four centuries after the Stationer‘s Guild articulated it to the Star 
Chamber, Professor Landes and Judge Posner used it in their attempt to justify copyright. 
They argued: 
In [the] absence [of copyright protection] anyone can buy a copy of the book 
when it first appears and make and sell copies of it. The market price of the 
book will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost of copying, with the un-
fortunate result that the book probably will not be produced in the first place, 
because the author and publisher will not be able to recover their costs of creat-
ing the work. 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 325, 328 (1989). 
 39. I am not particularly interested in whether we characterize these higher prices as 
―monopoly‖ or not. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Econom-
ic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-38 (2000).  
 40. THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on 
the 5th of February, 1841,  in 8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 199 (Lady Trevelyan 
ed., 1897), available at http://yarchive.net/macaulay/copyright.html. 
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work in the first place. Striking the correct balance between access 
and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.41  
 In devising an optimal copyright system, this supposed balance 
between incentives and access has become the central guide: too little 
copyright and we will have too few original works; too much and we 
will not be able to enjoy the works we have. Only through the appro-
priate balancing of incentives and access will we have neither too lit-
tle nor too much copyright develop—copyright will be just right, or at 
least, that‘s the conventional wisdom.  
 Yet, there are problems with this approach. First, as it is usually 
phrased, the attempt to balance incentives and access is incomplete 
and mischaracterizes the issue. Second, even if we knew what to bal-
ance, we may not have the information that we need to devise a copy-
right system that strikes the balance appropriately.42 Part A reviews 
what we know about devising an optimal copyright system, given the 
information available. Part B then presents some new empirical data 
examining the impact of the Internet and digital technology on the 
music industry in the United States to see what light, if any, that 
new information may cast on the question of optimal copyright. Here 
we find, somewhat surprisingly, that while revenue is down, output 
in the music industry is up.  
A.   Neither Too Much nor Too Little, the Search 
for “Goldilocks” Copyright 
 Even if we think of an exclusive right to prohibit copying as a form 
of property, property rights in information and other goods character-
ized by non-rivalrous consumption, so-called ―public‖ goods, lack the 
intrinsic desirability of property rights in goods characterized by ri-
                                                                                                                  
 41. Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 326; see Computer Assocs. Int‘l, Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (―[C]opyright law seeks to establish a delicate equi-
librium. On the one hand, it affords protection to authors as an incentive to create, and, on 
the other, it must appropriately limit the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects 
of monopolistic stagnation.‖); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Free-
dom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 100 (1997) (―[C]opyright law seeks to balance 
the level of incentives to create and the interest in maximizing access to information once 
created. Finding the correct balance between access and incentives is the central task of 
copyright policy.‖); Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright 
Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) (―To function properly, copyright law must strike a 
balance between the rights given to copyright authors and the access given to copyright 
users.‖). But see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11 (2003) (acknowledging that while the balance between 
incentives and access is important, it cannot account for everything). 
 42. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents 
of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1310 (2001) (―Although the minimalist 
framework, as a theoretical matter, accurately captures the essential considerations under-
lying copyright law (that is, the basic balance between access and incentives), lack of in-
formation and numerous practical difficulties in applying the framework serve to limit its 
ability to generate clear or effective results.‖).  
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valrous consumption, so-called ―private‖ goods. While copyright may 
be necessary to encourage the creation and release of an original 
work of authorship, once the work has been created and released, 
copyright becomes simply an encumbrance. By raising the price of 
access to original works, it creates a deadweight loss for those con-
sumers unable to afford the higher price.  
 But the deadweight loss from higher prices is not the only cost 
that copyright creates. Copyright prohibits a wide range of potential 
uses of copyrighted works absent the copyright owner‘s consent.43 
This effectively imposes a licensing requirement for those uses and 
thereby creates transaction costs that would not otherwise exist. 
Where those transaction costs exceed the potential gains from trade 
for particular uses, it blocks the use directly and thus creates exter-
nalities. And by requiring the copyright owner‘s permission, it limits 
our ability to put an original work to all of its highest and best uses. 
Instead of a work being put to all of its valuable uses—as it should be 
given its public good character—it is put only to those uses of which 
the copyright owner approves.  
 As a result, an original work of authorship, once created and dis-
seminated, will be less valuable to society with copyright than with-
out, and it will be less valuable with more copyright than with less.44 
 Moreover, copyright generates a second cost, one that does not 
arise from limiting access to existing works. Specifically, copyright 
can push popular authors and artists onto the backward-bending por-
tion of the labor supply curve and thus perversely lead to fewer 
works from the most popular authors and artists.45 The labor supply 
curve becomes backward-bending at the point where a worker‘s earn-
ings become high enough that the worker begins to value leisure 
more highly than labor. If you pay me one thousand dollars per hour, 
I will work more than if you pay me one hundred dollars per hour. 
But if you pay me ten thousand dollars per hour or one hundred 
thousand dollars per hour, at some point I will begin to work less. 
When my earnings become high enough, I will want to spend my time 
doing the things that I most enjoy, rather than working. As an exam-
                                                                                                                  
 43. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Derivative Works, and the Economics of 
Complements, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779, 802-03 (2010). 
 44. As Arrow has explained: ―It is necessary to distinguish between the realized social 
benefit and the potential social benefit, . . . which, in this case, means the sale of the prod-
uct at postinvention cost, c‟. Clearly, the potential social benefit always exceeds the real-
ized social benefit.‖ Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in NAT‘L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 622 (1962); see also William W. Fish-
er III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1715-17 (1988); 
Landes & Posner, supra note 38, at 341-42 (explaining that consumer and producer surplus 
would be higher with less copyright protection). 
 45. See Lunney, supra note 9, at 890-92.   
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ple of this, Mike Scherer has traced the productivity of Giuseppi Ver-
di, one of the most influential 19th century Italian composers, follow-
ing the introduction of copyright in northern Italy. After copyright 
was introduced and Verdi‘s per-opera earnings increased, Verdi sub-
stantially reduced the number of operas he wrote and released each 
decade.46 My own favorite example of this is country-and-western 
singer, Garth Brooks. After releasing his first album in 1989, Mr. 
Brooks became one of the top-selling solo artists of all time. Yet, ra-
ther than encourage Mr. Brooks to write and perform more music, 
copyright ensured that Mr. Brooks earned so much from his music 
that he could afford to and did retire in 2001, at the age of 39. While 
he announced his return to music in 2009 and is doing stage shows in 
Las Vegas, since his retirement, Garth Brooks has not been the crea-
tive musical force that he was during the 1990s.   
 Rather than the unhelpful catch-phrase, ―access,‖ copyright‘s prin-
cipal costs within the markets for the creation and dissemination of 
copyrighted works arise from its uniform scope of protection and the 
resulting overprotection of works that would have been created and 
disseminated with less or no copyright. When we consider the range 
of original works that could potentially be created, we find that some 
works will be brought forth with no or very little copyright protection, 
while others require more copyright protection. Yet, copyright re-
mains a fundamentally one-size-fits-all system. If we increase copy-
right protection in order to bring forth those works that require more 
protection, we will also provide that same increased protection to all 
of the preexisting works.47 Because of these works‘ public-good char-
acter, overprotecting the preexisting works reduces their social value, 
                                                                                                                  
 46. F.M. Scherer, The Emergence of Musical Copyright in Europe from 1709 to 1850, 5 
REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3, 11 (2008) [hereinafter Scherer, The Emergence of 
Musical Copyright]; see also F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES: THE 
ECONOMICS OF MUSIC COMPOSITION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 194 
(2004) (explaining that new copyright policies made a ―substantial difference‖ to Verdi‘s 
compositional effort); F.M. Scherer, The Evolution of Music Markets, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 123, 138 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & David Throsby eds., 
2006) (offering Giuseppi Verdi as another example of copyright pushing an artist onto the 
backward-bending portion of the labor supply curve). As Professor Scherer explained: 
Verdi‘s abundant surviving correspondence makes it clear that the maestro 
viewed opera composition as exhausting drudgery. As his wealth accumulated, 
Verdi reduced his compositional effort — from 14 operas in the 1840s to seven 
in the 1850s, two in the 1860s, and one each in the succeeding three decades. 
The reduction in effort cannot be attributed to declining ability; some of Verdi‘s 
great operas are among the handful of late compositions. Rather, his corre-
spondence makes clear, the higher ―price‖ elicited for each opera made it possi-
ble to reduce effort along a classic backward-bending supply curve. 
Scherer, The Emergence of Musical Copyright, supra note 46, at 11. 
 47. By preexisting, I mean that the works would have been created and disseminated 
with less or no copyright protection. 
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and it is this overprotection cost for the preexisting works that we 
must balance against the social value added by any additional works 
that broader copyright brings forth. Specifically, overprotection re-
duces the social value of works that would have been created and dis-
seminated with less or no copyright; and it ensures that the most 
popular authors and artists receive payment for their work that so 
far exceeds their reservation cost for that work that it likely reduces 
the output of these authors and artists.48 Against these overprotec-
tion costs, broader copyright‘s principal benefit is the value of those 
additional works that would not be forthcoming but for broader copy-
right.  
 This shift in emphasis, from balancing benefits from additional 
works against costs for preexisting works, rather than benefits 
against costs for a particular work, may seem trivial, but it is critical-
ly important. When we consider the potential range of original works 
that broader copyright could bring forth, we will likely find, to the 
extent works of authorship exhibit similar cost and demand struc-
tures, that there is some normal distribution in the number of works 
that increasing copyright protection will bring forth, as Figure 1 il-
lustrates.  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Additional Work Brought Forth as  
Copyright Protection Increases. 
 
 
 The idea in Figure 1 is that different works require different levels 
of copyright protection to ensure their expected profitability and 
                                                                                                                  
 48. In addition to these costs, copyright may also skew the incentives for authors, 
encouraging authors to create popular works at the expense of great works. See Lunney, 
supra note 9, at 888-90. 
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hence creation. Thus, copyright protection at level A ensures the ex-
pected profitability of works at A and to the left of A. Given the copy-
right protection available, works to the right of A remain unprofita-
ble and will not be forthcoming. If we want to increase output in the 
copyright sector, we need to increase the level of copyright protection, 
moving, for example, from A to B on Figure 1. Such an increase in 
copyright protection will ensure the expected profitability of a larger 
category of works and will bring forth those additional works that lie 
between A and B. 
 Yet, if we expand protection from level A to level B, copyright‘s 
uniform term and scope of protection means that we will provide the 
broader protection not only to the additional works that the increased 
copyright protection brings forth, but also to the preexisting works 
that would have been brought forth with less or no copyright protec-
tion. Moving from A to B will thus increase the overprotection costs 
associated with these preexisting works. Nevertheless, as Figure 1 
suggests, in moving from A to B, the overprotection costs associated 
with preexisting works will not prove overwhelmingly large. For such 
a move, the preexisting works consist only of those works that lie un-
der the distribution curve to the left of A. This is only a relative few, 
both in absolute number and relative to the number of additional 
works the shift to B brings forth.  
 On the other hand, if we move from a lot of copyright protection to 
even more, moving from C to D on Figure 1, the overprotection costs 
become substantial. For this move, the preexisting works consist of 
all of those that lie under the distribution curve to the left of C. This 
is a very large number of preexisting works, both in absolute terms 
and relative to the number of additional works that the shift to D 
brings forth. Even if one believes that an efficient licensing market 
will help reduce the overprotection costs for any given work, when we 
add up the overprotection costs for such a very large number of 
preexisting works, those costs likely become prohibitive.   
 It‘s true that, even when framed properly, this balance between 
the costs and benefits of broader copyright remains an empirical 
question. Nevertheless, it does not take detailed economic infor-
mation to get an accurate, if very rough, sense for the likely costs and 
benefits for some copyright and copyright-like expansions. Consider 
the 1998 copyright term extension, which extended copyright from 
life-plus-fifty years to life-plus-seventy years. On the benefit side, the 
first question should have been: How many additional works will an 
additional twenty years of protection bring forth? The probable an-
swer, given the uncertainty and discounting associated with any rev-
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enue so far in the future, is statistically indistinguishable from zero.49 
On the other side of the balance, adding twenty years to copyright‘s 
term has a considerable social cost. Specifically, it ties up the vast 
number of works that would have been created even without the 
term extension—essentially all works—for an additional twenty 
years. In short, the proposed extension generated all costs and no 
benefits.50 Or consider the recent proposals for fashion design protec-
tion. On the benefit side, the initial question again is: How many ad-
ditional designs will we get by providing fashion design protection? 
My own sense, here, given the strong reputational rents already 
available for creative designers,51 is very little. On the other side of 
the balance, the question is: What is the cost to society of protecting 
all of the fashion designs that we would have gotten even without 
such protection? Given the great variety of designs being produced 
without such protection today, my own sense, again, is that the likely 
costs of overprotecting all of the preexisting designs would be sub-
stantial. As with copyright term extension, the costs of fashion-
design protection will likely prove so high, and the benefits, if they 
exist at all, would be so small, it would seem that the only reasonable 
answer we can reach is that fashion-design protection would reduce 
social welfare.52 
 While this balancing of costs and benefits can therefore prove use-
ful, it remains incomplete. So far in balancing the costs and benefits 
                                                                                                                  
 49. Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-9, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846. Of the seventeen 
economists who signed the brief, five (George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, 
Ronald Coase, and Milton Friedman) are Nobel Prize winners. ALL NOBEL PRIZES, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).  
 50. Lord Macaulay made the same basic point in arguing against copyright term ex-
tension in England in the 19th century. As he explained in a speech to the House of Com-
mons in 1841: 
A monopoly of sixty years produces twice as much evil as a monopoly of thirty 
years, and thrice as much evil as a monopoly of twenty years. But it is by no 
means the fact that a posthumous monopoly of sixty years gives to an author 
thrice as much pleasure and thrice as strong a motive as a posthumous monop-
oly of twenty years. On the contrary, the difference is so small as to be hardly 
perceptible. We all know how faintly we are affected by the prospect of very dis-
tant advantages, even when they are advantages which we may reasonably 
hope that we shall ourselves enjoy. But an advantage that is to be enjoyed more 
than half a century after we are dead, by somebody, we know not by whom, 
perhaps by somebody unborn, by somebody utterly unconnected with us, is re-
ally no motive at all to action. 
MACAULAY, supra note 40, at 198-202. 
 51. For a formal model of reputation rents and innovation, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 1, 58-63 (2004). 
 52. For a longer argument on this issue, see Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, 
The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1687 (2006). 
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of broadening copyright, we have relied on two usually unspoken as-
sumptions. First, we have focused solely on the markets for copy-
righted works and have ignored how broader copyright might inter-
act with imperfections in other markets. Such a partial equilibrium 
approach necessarily assumes, inter alia, that all other markets are 
complete (i.e. that there are no externalities in other markets) and 
perfectly competitive.53 Second, we have also assumed that consum-
ers will be willing to substitute unauthorized copies of an original 
work for authorized copies,54 even if that threatens the creation of a 
given work.  
 Neither assumption matches the real world, however. Other mar-
kets suffer from imperfections too.55 Free riders, positive externali-
ties, and copying are present not only in the market for original 
works of authorship but are ubiquitous features of virtually every 
market. Similarly, while consumers may sometimes substitute an 
unauthorized copy of an original work for an authorized copy, they 
will not always do so. Particularly when that substitution begins to 
threaten the incentives necessary to ensure an original work‘s crea-
tion, we should expect a consumer‘s own self-interest to lead the con-
sumer to purchase the authorized copy or otherwise contribute to the 
creation of the original work.56 Acknowledging this more complicated 
reality and adopting more realistic assumptions on these issues 
sharply narrows copyright‘s optimal scope.  
 As I have shown elsewhere, when we acknowledge that other 
markets face free riding, positive externalities, and copying, copy-
right will tend to ensure the allocation of available resources to their 
highest and best use when it ensures that those who invest in the 
creation and dissemination of original works, more generally, experi-
ence a return neither greater than nor less than the return available 
for creative work in other fields.57 Such an approach leads to the op-
                                                                                                                  
 53. See Lunney, supra note 24, at 488 n.13; see also JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS 
OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 317-18 (1933). 
 54. Perhaps, the assumption is that consumers cannot tell the difference between 
authorized and unauthorized copying, but that can be addressed by a law requiring proper 
labeling.  
 55. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 53, at 51, 88-89; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright‟s 
Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 406-09 (2008) (―In short, mar-
kets for creativity, wherever they are found in the economy, are neither complete nor per-
fectly competitive.‖). 
 56. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 
12 TULANE J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 17, 20, 32 (2009). 
 57. See Lunney, supra note 24, at 599-601; see also Lunney, supra note 55, at 447 
(showing that such a rough equivalence promotes an efficient allocation of resources in a 
second-best world). Terry Fisher has acknowledged the importance of this point but has 
expressed the concern that my proposed solution ―would sacrifice most of the economic 
benefits highlighted by Demsetz and Goldstein.‖ William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual 
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 182 (Ste-
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timal allocation of available resources in two respects. First, it would 
lead additional resources to be allocated to creating additional works 
if that represents the highest valued use of those resources. But, se-
cond, it would not lead additional resources to be allocated to creat-
ing additional works if there is some other use of those resources that 
would create more value. As it turns out, this standard also has the 
advantage that it is relatively easy to implement given the empirical 
information available. For example, if we are trying to determine 
copyright‘s optimal duration, determining whether the costs out-
weigh the benefits for extending copyright from life-plus-fifty years to 
life-plus-seventy years was relatively easy, even under the partial 
equilibrium approach. However, attempting to use that approach to 
define whether the optimal copyright term is one year, five years, ten 
years, or something longer is much more difficult.  
 In contrast, if our goal is to ensure authors and copyright owners a 
period of exclusivity approximately the same as the lead-time availa-
ble to other innovators, the empirical data to determine the optimal 
                                                                                                                  
phen Munzer ed., 2001). The concern seems to be that without a legal right to control cer-
tain users, creators of original works will not receive appropriate pricing signals. As Paul 
Goldstein has argued: ―The logic of property rights dictates their extension into every cor-
ner in which people derive enjoyment and value from literary and artistic works. To stop 
short of these ends would deprive producers of the signals of consumer preference that 
trigger and direct their investments.‖ PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY 178-79 
(1994). This is utter nonsense. It fundamentally misunderstands the nature of pricing in 
competitive markets. As an example, consider Professor Goldstein‘s argument that we 
would have too few books suitable for making into movies unless an author has a right to 
charge a separate licensing fee for making a movie from the book. See GOLDSTEIN, supra, 
at 178-81. Using his reasoning, we could equally well argue that we will have too few off-
road capable vehicles unless carmakers have the right to charge a separate licensing fee for 
off-road use. Without a property right to price such use separately, how will car-makers 
receive an appropriate price signal for off-road capable vehicles? As we all readily recog-
nize, the off-road use argument is wrong, but for the same reasons, so is Goldstein‘s argu-
ment for a derivative work right. In competitive markets, prices are a function of costs, not 
of consumer values. As a result, if vehicles suitable for both on- and off-road use cost more 
to bring to market than vehicles suitable for only on-road use, then so long as there is suffi-
cient demand, the price for off-road capable vehicles will be higher. If they are not more 
costly, then the price will not be higher. We do not need an ―off-road use‖ right that a car-
maker can separately license in order to generate appropriate pricing signals. It‘s the same 
for books. If a book suitable for movie use is more costly to write, then the market price for 
such books will be higher. If not, then not. Again, no ―movie making‖ derivative work right 
is necessary for appropriate pricing signals. I have explained elsewhere the differences 
between cars and books that might justify a derivate work right. See Lunney, supra note 
24, at 628-30, 632, 641. In short, a derivate work right can be justified only if it is neces-
sary to ensure the creation of the book in the first place or if there is only going to be one 
movie-version of the book. As it turns out, both rationales are persuasive only if the associ-
ated feature film is likely to be a natural monopoly, even in the absence of copyright. See 
Lunney, supra note 43, at 814. While movies have historically had such a character, digital 
technology is reducing that natural monopoly character, as well as the natural monopoly 
character of radio airplay. As it does so, rights that were sensible given the associated nat-
ural monopolies, such as the derivative work right and the public performance right, will 
likely become increasingly unnecessary and, indeed, undesirable.  
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copyright term is readily available.58 For innovations protected by 
trade secrets, innovators on average have a lead-time of two to twelve 
years.59 Given patentee‘s decisions on whether to pay the mainte-
nance fees or not, patents, on average, last eleven years.60 If copy-
right competes for resources, such as creativity, with these other cre-
ative, but not copyrightable sectors of the economy, then to avoid ei-
ther an underproduction or an overproduction of original works, cop-
yright‘s original fourteen-year term seems pretty close to ideal.61 
Such an approach also suggests that copyright‘s principal, if not ex-
clusive, focus should be on mechanical duplication, as that is the 
principal difference between copying the creativity in original works 
and copying creativity elsewhere in the economy.62  
                                                                                                                  
 58. Some may argue that, even given the proper framework, we still don‘t have suffi-
cient information to determine copyright‘s optimal scope perfectly. My own sense is that we 
have sufficient information to design copyright well enough. Yet, if one accepts the argu-
ment that we can‘t tell whether the additional works that broader copyright may bring 
forth are more or less valuable than the alternative uses to which those resources would 
otherwise be devoted, that lack of empirical evidence inevitably leads to a simple answer as 
to the optimal scope of copyright protection: none. This is because copyright imposes real 
costs. If it does not generate equally real welfare gains, it cannot be justified. The only net 
welfare gain copyright offers is encouraging the production of additional original works 
when that represents a more valuable use of the available resources than the alternative to 
which those resources would otherwise be devoted. If we can‘t tell which use is more highly 
valued, then copyright has no welfare gains to offer and should either be abolished or be 
recognized as a poorly designed charitable mechanism for redistributing wealth from socie-
ty to copyright owners. See Tom W. Bell, Authors‟ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mech-
anism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 231-32 (2003).   
 59. As a general rule under trade secret law, a successful plaintiff is entitled to a 
―lead-time‖ injunction—an injunction that lasts only for the time it would have taken the 
defendant to discover the secret lawfully, either by reverse engineering, independent de-
velopment, or otherwise. See, e.g., K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 
1974). In their treatise on trade secret law, Roger Milgrim and Eric Bensen cite a number 
of illustrative cases applying this principle. See ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, 4 
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 15.02[1][d] (2014). Some of these cases deny injunctive relief 
on the grounds that the lead-time period had already expired; some grant permanent in-
junctions. Of the twenty cases they cite that grant an injunction for a specific time, the 
duration of the injunctions ranges from 3 months to 10 years, with a mean of 2.5 years, a 
median of 2 years, and a mode of 3 years. Id. § 15.02[1][d] n.20. 
 60. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1504 (2001) (presenting in Table 3 data showing that patentees pay the maintenance 
fees due eleven years after the patent issues for less than forty percent of the patents is-
sued). Moreover, even while a patent remains in force, it does not usually preclude compet-
itive entry. See Edwin Mansfield, Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and 
Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907, 913 (1981) (―Contrary to popular opinion, 
patent protection does not make entry impossible, or even unlikely. Within 4 years of their 
introduction, 60% of the patented successful innovations in our sample were imitated.‖).  
 61. Alternatively, under this approach, one might argue that patent protection should 
be longer but, given the relative political economies involved, the patent term is likely to be 
far closer to socially optimal than the copyright term. 
 62. See Lunney, supra note 24, at 626 (―To the extent the relative copying advantages 
depicted in Tables 6 and 9 represent the relative copying advantages available to authors 
generally, the empirical evidence tends to establish that copyright should protect literary 
works only against exact or near-exact duplication.‖). 
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 Adopting more realistic assumptions and recognizing the need to 
account for the imperfections inevitably present elsewhere in the 
economy thus suggests a far narrower optimal scope for copyright 
than does a partial equilibrium approach. Yet, a more careful exami-
nation of the second usually unspoken assumption—that consumers 
will free ride and substitute a less expensive or free, unauthorized 
copy for an authorized copy whenever they can—may go even further. 
It may suggest that there is no need for copyright at all.  
 When it comes to the question of whether a rational, self-
interested consumer will either (i) pay for access or (ii) free ride, the 
consumer has two conflicting desires that she must reconcile. First, 
she enjoys the work and wants it to exist, so she wants the author to 
receive sufficient payment to ensure the work‘s creation. Second, 
while wanting to ensure the work‘s creation, our consumer also 
wants to pay as little for access to the work as possible. In sum, our 
music consumer wants the work for free, but she knows that if every-
one free rides, the work will not be created.  
 We can analyze how a consumer will resolve this dilemma using a 
game theoretic framework and the principles of Nash equilibrium.63 
When we do, we find a mixture of paid access and free riding that, in 
the absence of copyright, may lead to suboptimal incentives, but may 
not. It depends on our starting assumptions. In economic theory and 
in the economy, there are some public goods that markets can pro-
duce efficiently, without the need for specific government interven-
tion. For our purposes, the relevant distinction is between continuous 
public goods, where the choice is between more or less of the public 
good at issue, and discrete public goods, where the choice is between 
having or not having the public good. With respect to music and 
works of authorship more generally, if we assume that the relevant 
market is for original works generally and analyze the issue as one 
involving a continuous public good, then we find the familiar, under-
production result. While consumers will pay something for access to 
the original works, there will be too little paid access and too much 
free riding and as a result, the market will produce too few original 
works in the absence of copyright.64 On the other hand, if we assume 
that the relevant market is for a particular work of authorship—a 
particular song or book or movie, rather than just more songs, books, 
or movies, and analyze the issue as one involving discrete public 
                                                                                                                  
 63. As John Nash explained it: ―an equilibrium point is . . . such that each play-
er‘s . . . strategy maximizes his payoff if the strategies of the others are held fixed.‖ John 
Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286, 287 (1951); see also John 
F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 48, 48-49 
(1950) (introducing his equilibrium concepts). 
 64. For a formal partial equilibrium proof of this result, see Lunney, supra note 55, 
app. at 449-51. 
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goods, then we reach a quite different conclusion. At the robust Nash 
equilibria, while there may be free riding, consumers will neverthe-
less pay enough to ensure the work‘s creation.65 As a result, if con-
sumers view individual works, rather than works generally, as the 
relevant market, then the market will produce an optimal supply of 
original works even in the absence of copyright.66  
 Consider a simple subscription model. There are N consumers who 
each have some reservation value for a work, Vi. To ensure creation 
and dissemination of the work, the author must receive some reser-
vation cost, C. Returning to a partial equilibrium approach, for the 
sake of simplicity, assume that the work is worth more than it costs, 
or ∑Vi ≥ C, and therefore welfare would be improved if the work is 
created. Each consumer can make a binding commitment to pay some 
price for access to the work, Pi, or can choose to free ride. The work 
will be created if the sum of the prices consumers promise to pay ex-
ceeds the cost of the work: ∑Pi ≥ C. Otherwise, the work will not be 
created. Consumers pay only if the work is created.  
 Given this set-up, we find two types of Nash equilibria. In the 
first, the sum of the promised prices exactly equals the author‘s res-
ervation cost: ∑Pi = C.67 While some free riding may occur in these 
equilibria,68 enough consumers pay for access to cover the author‘s 
reservation cost. As a result, the work is created, and the market 
reaches an efficient and Pareto optimal outcome. In the second, the 
sum of the promised prices are insufficient to cover the author‘s reser-
vation cost, ∑Pi < C, and no single individual can increase their price 
sufficiently to make up the difference, C - ∑Pi > Vi – Pi for i=1, N.69 For 
these equilibria, too much free riding occurs, and the promised pay-
ments fail to cover the author‘s reservation cost. As a result, the work 
is not created, and the market fails to achieve the efficient outcome.  
                                                                                                                  
 65. See Lunney, supra note 56, at 15.  
 66. See Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, Participation and the Provision of 
Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 171, 190-91 (1984); see also 
Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, Joint Projects Without Commitment, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 
259 (1991); Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, Private Provision of Public Goods Can Be 
Efficient, 74 PUB. CHOICE 59, 59-61 (1992); Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, Private 
Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Efficient Equilibria in the Private-Information Contri-
bution Game, 37 ECON. THEORY 51, 51-53 (2007); Mark Gradstein, Efficient Provision of a 
Discrete Public Good, 35 INT‘L ECON. REV. 877, 877 (1994); Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo K. 
Monteiro & Akram Temimi, Private Provision of Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete 
Information, 35 J. MATH. ECON. 493, 495-96 (2001). 
 67. See Lunney, supra note 56, at 10-16. Instances where the sum of the prices ex-
ceeds the author‘s reservation costs are not Nash equilibria, because each consumer would 
want to reduce her promised price until the sum of the prices exactly equals the author‘s 
reservation costs.  
 68. Id. at 12-13. 
 69. If a single individual could make up the difference, then the individual would be 
better off doing so, and we would move to the first type of Nash equilibria. 
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 While these are both Nash equilibria, only the efficient equilibria, 
where the work is created, are robust.70 At one of the efficient Nash 
equilibria, for each and every consumer, any change in strategy 
would make the consumer worse off. Of course, even at these equilib-
ria, each consumer would still prefer to pay less if they could, but 
they cannot and so they will not. Attempting to pay less (or to pay 
nothing) would mean that the work would not be created and at these 
Nash equilibria, each consumer prefers to have the work created, 
given the price that they are paying, than to pay nothing and not 
have the work at all.71  
 In contrast, with respect to the inefficient Nash equilibria, where 
the work is not created, none of them are robust. At any one of the 
inefficient equilibria, a consumer has nothing to gain by changing her 
strategy, but she has nothing to lose either. At these Nash equilibria, 
the work will not be created and nothing will be paid. As a result, 
consumers who did not promise their full reservation value are indif-
ferent between their current promised price and a slightly higher or 
lower promised price. Moreover, such a consumer will actively prefer 
any of the Nash equilibria where the work is created to any of the 
Nash equilibria where it is not. Given that preference, if a consumer 
has any uncertainty as to what other consumers will bid, a consumer 
who has promised a price less than his or her reservation value has 
an incentive to increase his or her promised price. By bidding some-
what more, a consumer can increase the likelihood that the work will 
be created. Taken together, this means that the inefficient Nash 
equilibria are not robust. No consumer has any incentive to stay at 
any of them and if they could find a way to move to one of the effi-
cient Nash equilibria, they would.  
 Given this and contrary to longstanding belief, the market may 
well be capable, even in the absence of copyright, of producing origi-
nal works of authorship efficiently. So long as consumers desire spe-
cific, individual works of authorship and therefore treat original 
works as discrete public goods, the massive government intervention 
that copyright represents may prove entirely unnecessary.  
 As is so common with economic modeling, our starting assumption 
thus dictates our result. An assumption that the relevant market is 
for works generally leads us to the continuous public goods model 
and the conclusion that the market will invariably produce too few 
original works. In contrast, an assumption that consumers are look-
ing for a specific work leads us to the discrete public goods model and 
                                                                                                                  
 70. For a discussion of the concepts economists use to sort Nash equilibria, see ERIC 
VAN DAMME, REFINEMENTS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT (1983). 
 71. I am employing the conventional tie breaker, such that having the work is worth 
just slightly more to the consumer, even at her reservation value, than not having  
the work. 
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the opposite conclusion: For such discrete public goods, the market 
can achieve an efficient, Pareto optimal outcome and produce an op-
timal supply of original works. The question then becomes whether 
the continuous or discrete public goods analysis better matches the 
real world characteristics of original works. This in turn depends up-
on whether consumers: (i) consider any given original work suffi-
ciently unique to constitute its own market; or (ii) consider each orig-
inal work merely an indistinguishable widget that together with oth-
er original works (also indistinguishable widgets) form a broader 
market for works generally. Which model better describes the actual 
market or markets for original works will thus depend entirely on 
consumer preferences and may vary for different types of works.  
 Yet, to the extent consumers consider an original work sufficiently 
unique to constitute its own market, we may not need copyright at 
all. Instead, all we may need are market mechanisms that (i) enable 
consumers to commit to purchasing access to a work; and (ii) help 
consumers reach one of the efficient Nash equilibria. While such 
mechanisms may have been difficult to implement in an analog 
world,72 we have already seen several practical implementations of 
such mechanisms on the Internet, including Kickstarter,73 Stephen 
King‘s marketing of the novella, The Plant, and Nine Inch Nails‘s re-
lease of tracks from its Ghost I-IV album.74  
 Economic theory thus reaches somewhat inconsistent conclusions 
on the underlying need for copyright and on how to define its proper 
limits, depending on the assumptions with which we begin. We need 
not rely on theory alone, however. The rise of file sharing provides a 
rare opportunity to test copyright‘s fundamental premises and the 
competing predictions of economic theory against economic reality. In 
the next section, we explore how the rise of file sharing has affected 
creative output in the music industry.  
                                                                                                                  
 72. As I have discussed elsewhere, lighthouses represent a discrete public good and 
were initially funded through a subscription model. See Lunney, supra note 56, at 22. 
 73. Kickstarter is a website that allows individuals to propose projects and solicit 
donations to support the projects. It is a subscription-based model where the donations are 
made, and the project only proceeds if a specified level of support is reached. Launched on 
April 21, 2009, Kickstarter has enabled individuals to raise an estimated $1 billion for 
their projects. See Seven Things to Know About Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/hello (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). Musicians have used Kick-
starter to pay for the production costs for a new album and for tours. For example, in 2012, 
Amanda Palmer raised more than one million dollars from more than 17,000 individual 
donations for a tour and a new album. See Alison Fensterstock, Making Her Own Way: Do-
It-Yourself Singer Amanda Palmer Uses 1990s Ingenuity and 21st Century Savvy to Fi-
nance Her Rise to Fame, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 15, 2012, at C-1.  
 74. See Lunney, supra note 9, at 863-64; Lunney, supra note 56, at 23-24. 
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B.   Testing Theory Empirically: File Sharing 
and Music Output 
 We are all familiar with file sharing‘s basic story. Since Napster 
opened its virtual doors in 1999, widespread consumer copying and 
distribution of copyrighted works through file sharing services has 
become the new reality. Copyright owners have tried to stop it, of 
course. They have sued both file sharing services, such as Napster, 
Aimster, and Grokster,75 and individual file sharers.76 While winning 
the vast majority of these battles, copyright owners have just as sure-
ly been losing the war. Despite their lawsuits and their educational 
campaigns, file sharing has become remarkably widespread. For vir-
tually every copyrighted song, television program, and movie that 
exists, a consumer, without much effort, can obtain her own unau-
thorized copy for free by file sharing. As a formal matter, copyright 
continues to provide an extremely high level of protection; as a prac-
tical matter, the effective level of protection copyright provides to 
original works has fallen radically. Given this sharp reduction in 
copyright protection, the natural question becomes: How has it af-
fected creative output?  
 To begin our examination of this issue, Figure 2 presents an esti-
mate of the file sharing traffic on the Internet in North America, 
from Cisco‘s Visual Networking Index for 2008 and 2014.77  
 
                                                                                                                  
 75. See Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) 
(reversing summary judgment in favor of Grokster and remanding for reconsideration un-
der newly articulated inducement standard for secondary liability); In re Aimster Copy-
right Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction 
against Aimster); Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Lime Group, L.L.C., 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 409-
10 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting summary judgment motion holding Lime Group liable for 
inducing copyright infringement). 
 76. See Sony BMG Music Entm‘t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 489-90 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(affirming finding of copyright infringement against an individual for file sharing); Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001-02, 1016 (D. Minn. 2011) (af-
firming finding of copyright infringement for uploading twenty-four songs through a file-
sharing program, but reducing damages award to $54,000). 
 77. CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY, 2013-
2018, at 11 (2014) [hereinafter CISCO, 2014 VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX]; CISCO, CISCO 
VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY, 2007-2012, at 4 (2008). 
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Figure 2. Estimates of File Sharing Traffic on the Internet:  
North America (in petabytes/month). Source: Cisco,  
Visual Networking Index for 2008 and 2014. 
 
 
 As Figure 2 reflects, file sharing traffic in North America in 2012 
amounted to roughly eight hundred petabytes per month. Just to give 
a sense of scale to this issue, the typical music CD contains 800 meg-
abytes of data. One step up from a megabyte is a gigabyte. A gigabyte 
is one thousand megabytes, and a typical DVD contains 4 gigabytes 
of data. A petabyte is one million gigabytes. At eight hundred 
petabytes per month, the current rate of file sharing traffic repre-
sents approximately 200 million DVDs or 1 billion CDs, copied each 
month. Compare that to the roughly 139 million albums that I esti-
mated U.S. consumers made through file sharing on Napster in Sep-
tember 2000,78 and we can see that, despite the copyright industries‘ 
―victories‖ over file sharing, file sharing has increased substantially 
over the past twelve years. While not all of this traffic represents the 
unauthorized copying and distribution of copyrighted works, esti-
mates suggest that the vast majority of it does.79 
 Interestingly, in its two most recent indices, released in May 2013 
and June 2014, Cisco projects that file sharing traffic in North Amer-
ica will grow much more slowly from 2012 to 2018 than it did from 
                                                                                                                  
 78. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 975, 1028 (2002). 
 79. Cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922 (2005) 
(noting that a study by an expert for the plaintiff showed that ―nearly 90% of the files 
available for download on the FastTrack system were copyrighted works‖).  
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2006 through 2012.80 Instead of continuing to grow by fifteen to twen-
ty percent annually, as Cisco had consistently projected in its 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 indices, in its 2013 and 2014 indices, Cis-
co projected that file sharing traffic will grow by only seven to nine 
percent annually in North America from 2012-2018.  It is not clear 
what is behind this slowdown. In its 2013 and 2014 indices, Cisco 
projects a slowdown in the growth rate for file sharing traffic over the 
next four years—but the slowdown is not limited to just North Amer-
ica. The slowdown is projected worldwide. Indeed, for two of its re-
gions, Africa and the Middle East, and Western Europe, Cisco pro-
jects that file sharing traffic will actually start declining, at respec-
tive rates of twelve and two percent annually, over the next four 
years.81 Given that the slowdown is worldwide, the slowing growth 
rate does not appear to be the result of a legal intervention by any 
particular country. It may simply be that file sharing is running its 
inherently self-limiting course and reaching an equilibrium. In a fi-
nite world, nothing can continue to grow geometrically indefinitely. 
Yet, regardless of whatever is causing the slowdown in the growth of 
file sharing traffic, the slowdown itself tends to diminish the need for 
further legal intervention to address the file sharing issue. 
 In any event, unable to stop file sharing, the effective level of cop-
yright protection provided to original works has fallen dramatically 
since 1999. As file sharing has grown and the de facto level of copy-
right protection provided has fallen, the music industry, in particu-
lar, has been hard hit. With the rise of file sharing, the music indus-
try has seen revenue from record sales decline steadily and sharply. 
To illustrate, Figure 3 presents the RIAA‘s total dollar value for mu-
sic shipments, in all formats, whether physical or electronic, from 
1973 to 2013.82 In order to account for inflation, shipments are in 
constant 2013 dollars.  
 
                                                                                                                  
 80. CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY, 2012-
2017, at 11 (2013) [hereinafter CISCO, 2013 VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX]; CISCO, 2014 
VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX, supra note 77, at 11. 
 81. CISCO, 2013 VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX, supra note 80, at 11 (2013); CISCO, 2014 
VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX, supra note 77, at 11. 
 82. This data is from the RIAA Shipment Data. Shipment Database, supra note 4 
(after subscribing as a member, select shipment data from year 1973 through 2013 to 
download data). The year 1973 is as far back as the RIAA data goes. 
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 The relevant question, however, is not whether file sharing caused 
this decline in record sales, but how this decline in record sales af-
fected the creation of new music. The Constitution gives Congress the 
authority to enact copyright law ―to promote the Progress of Sci-
ence . . . .‖84 This is the sole standard against which copyright law 
must measure itself. In defining this standard, the Court has ex-
plained that promoting the ―Progress of Science‖ encompasses two 
legitimate ends: (i) encouraging the creation of new works; and 
(ii) encouraging the dissemination of existing works.85 File sharing 
undoubtedly promotes the widespread dissemination of existing 
works. The concern has been that it will discourage the creation of 
new works because copyright owners are not directly compensated 
for the unauthorized copies of their works distributed through file 
sharing networks. Given that file sharing plainly serves to promote 
broader dissemination, the question becomes whether there is equal-
ly clear evidence that file sharing discourages the creation of new 
works. Before examining this question directly, I should acknowledge 
that record sales are not the only source of revenue that supports the 
creation of new music. Sync licenses,86 endorsement deals, concert 
ticket sales and associated merchandising, and public performance 
royalties, just to name a few, provide revenue streams that support 
the creation of new music, as well. Many of these are complements to 
the sale of recorded music and so may serve as a means for recaptur-
ing all or part of the revenue lost as a result of declining music sales.  
 While possible in theory, in reality, growth in the revenues associ-
ated with complementary products, such as live performances, has 
not done much to mitigate the decline in music sales. While we do not 
have data on all of the revenue sources available to artists and song-
writers, two of the main alternative revenue sources, concert revenue 
and public performances royalties, are available, and they have not 
grown sufficiently to offset the revenues lost from falling record sales. 
As reported by Pollstar, revenue from concerts in North America 
grew from $2.07 billion in 1999 (adjusted to 2012 dollars)87 to $4.3 
                                                                                                                  
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 85. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888-89 (2012); see also Harper & Row, Publishers 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (―[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate ideas.‖). 
 86. A synchronization license, or ―sync‖ license, is required when a movie, television 
program, or advertisement wants to include a musical work and synchronize the music to the 
visual images. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ‘g, 512 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 87. See Roy Trakin, The Concert Puzzle: Can the Live Concert Industry Rebound from 
a Difficult 2010?, GRAMMY.COM (Mar. 25, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.grammy.com/ 
news/the-concert-puzzle (―Over the last decade, as the recorded music industry contracted 
at a double-digit annual rate, the live concert touring business continued to grow, with 
worldwide ticket revenues rising from $1.5 billion in 1999 to $4.6 billion in 2009, according 
to Pollstar.‖). Adjustments to 2012 dollars were performed using the Bureau of Labor and 
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billion in 2012.88 Similarly, royalties paid by ASCAP and BMI for the 
public performance of musical works grew from $1.29 billion in 1999 
(again, adjusted to 2012 dollars) to $1.58 billion in 2012.89 Since 2003, 
SoundExchange has also begun paying royalties for the public per-
formance of sound recordings and has paid out approximately $462 
million in 2012.90 While these revenue sources grew faster than the 
rate of inflation, the total increase in revenue available from these 
alternative sources from 1999 to 2012, is not enough to offset the $13 
billion decline in revenue from record sales over that same period.91  
 This brings us to the heart of the matter: how has this decline in 
revenue affected creative output in the music industry? For four 
hundred years, copyright‘s fundamental premise has been that more 
revenue will lead to more and better creative works. If this premise is 
accurate, then the sharp decline in music industry revenue since 
1999 should have led to fewer or lower quality songs. Surprisingly, 
perhaps, given copyright‘s premise, it has not. 
 We begin with industry data. Figure 4 presents data from Sound-
Scan on the number of new albums released in the United States 
each year since 1996. 
                                                                                                                  
Statistics‘ CPI Inflation calculator. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR AND 
STATISTICS,  http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 88. See Pollstar‟s Top 200 North American Tours, POLLSTAR (Jan. 7, 2013, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.pollstar.com/news_article.aspx?ID=803803 (―With all 2012 box office reports for 
North America totaling more than $4.3 billion, the Top 100 tours accounted for more than 
half that amount, generating $2.52 billion.‖).  
 89. See ASCAP Reports 2012 Financials, ASCAP (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ascap.com/press/2013/0304-ascap-reports-2012-financials.aspx (―The American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), the worldwide leader in perform-
ing rights and advocacy for music creators, today announced that it distributed over $827 
million in royalties to its songwriter, composer and publisher members in the calendar year 
ended 2012, a slight increase over 2011.‖); Ed Christman, BMI Releases Results, Revenue 
Down 3.5% Due to Radio Rate Settlement, BILLBOARD (Sept. 20, 2012, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/1083703/bmi-releases-results-revenue-
down-35-due-to-radio-rate (―During the recently completed year, BMI distributed $749.8 
million in royalties, down 5.8% from the $796 million paid out in the prior year.‖); Tamara 
Conniff, ASCAP Composes Record Year, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 14, 2001 (―The American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers‘ revenue reached a record high of $576 mil-
lion last year, up $41 million from 1999, the company said Tuesday. Domestic and foreign 
royalty distribution to its members totaled $479.1 million. Domestic distribution increased 
12% from 1999, ASCAP chief John LoFrumento said.‖); Sherman Friedman, BMI Launches 
Online Song Registration, NEWSBYTES, June 19, 2000 (―BMI currently distributes about $500 
million in worldwide royalties from all media to its members on an annualized basis.‖). 
 90. SOUNDEXCHANGE, SOUNDEXCHANGE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2012, at 7 (2013), 
available at http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2012-Annual-
Report-06-13-13.pdf (―In 2012, SoundExchange‘s gross distributions were approximately 
$462 million.‖).  
 91. Cf. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, File Sharing and Copyright, in 10 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 21, 23 (2010), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
chapters/c11764.pdf (suggesting that sale of complementary goods has largely offset loss of 
record sale revenue, but including iPod sales and failing to account for inflation by using a 
nominal, rather than constant, dollar analysis). 
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that while housing starts or automobile production remained con-
stant, the size, quality, and features of the homes or cars had fallen. 
Nor did we need to argue that output in either sector remained high, 
but output would have been even higher but for the recession. The 
sort of sharp and immediately measurable decline in output that the-
se industries experienced reflects how a competitive and well-
functioning market responds to a sharp decline in revenue. In a com-
petitive market, firms are already operating at the margins of profit-
ability;93 they cannot simply absorb a sharp decline in revenue and 
maintain production. That the music industry was able to do so sug-
gests that the music industry may not operate in a comparably com-
petitive and well-functioning market.  
 In a just completed empirical study,94 I have nonetheless attempt-
ed to examine these issues directly and to account for the possibility 
that: (i) music quality might have fallen as a result of the revenue 
decline; or (ii) music output might have been higher but for the reve-
nue decline. In the study, I treat the rise of file sharing and the par-
allel fall in music industry revenue as a natural experiment in radi-
cally reduced copyright protection. To explore the relationship be-
tween copyright protection, revenue, and high quality creative out-
put, I created a hand-coded data set for the songs that appeared in 
the top fifty of the Billboard Hot 100 in the first week of each month 
for each year from 1985 through 2013. I focused on songs that ap-
peared in the top fifty of the Hot 100 in order to control for quality.95 
Both before and after file sharing, reaching the top fifty of the Hot 
100 provided some evidence of a song‘s ability to satisfy the musical 
preferences of music consumers. At a minimum, a new song will hit 
the top fifty of the Hot 100 only if consumers prefer it to the preexist-
ing songs otherwise available.96 Appearance in the top fifty thus pro-
vides a reasonable proxy for quality that should be consistent across 
the pre- and post-file sharing eras.  
 In the data set, for each of the 17,400 songs in the study, I coded, 
inter alia: (i) whether the song was performed by a New Artist, in 
that it was the artist‘s first appearance in the Top 50 and occurred 
                                                                                                                  
category/production-statistics/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (select each corresponding year 
under ―Production Statistics‖) (more detailed reports of production by year and type of 
vehicle may also be downloaded). 
 93. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 
400-01 (Ed Parsons ed., 5th ed. 1999). 
 94. See Lunney, supra note 7. 
 95. For other quality-consistent measures of music output, see Handke, supra note 7; 
Waldfogel, supra note 7; Joel Waldfogel, Bye, Bye, Miss American Pie? The Supply of New 
Recorded Music Since Napster (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16882, 
2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16882. 
 96. While listeners may have a preference for ―new,‖ as well as ―good,‖ music, there is 
no evidence that this preference has changed from the pre- to the post-file sharing era. 
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with, or before, the artist‘s first single on the artist‘s first studio al-
bum; and (ii) whether the song was a New Song, in that it had not 
previously appeared in the Top 50 and was not a cover. Once I had 
identified the New Artists for each year, I went back and created a 
second data set. In the second data set, for each New Artist, I deter-
mined: (i) the number of Top 50 chart appearances each New Artist 
had during the first ten calendar years of their career; and (ii) the 
number of different songs with which each New Artist hit the Top 50, 
again during the first ten calendar years of their career. Because this 
second data set covered an artist‘s first ten years, it covers a more 
limited time period and covers only those New Artists who first ap-
peared in the Top 50 from 1985-2005.97  
 After collecting the data, I used regression analysis to isolate and 
define any statistically significant correlations between revenue, file 
sharing, and music output. By using regression analysis, I was able 
to isolate the relationship between revenue and music output, re-
gardless of other changes that may have been occurring in the econ-
omy generally or in the music industry specifically, such as the de-
clining cost of album production. The regression analysis established 
that the sharp decline in revenue from music shipments following the 
rise of file sharing was associated, if we hold all else constant: (i) with 
fewer new artists entering the market; but (ii) also with more hit 
songs, on average, by those new artists who did enter. The first mar-
ginal effect, that the number of new artists declined as revenue fell, 
is entirely consistent with copyright‘s traditional incentives story. As 
revenue fell, an artist‘s expected earnings from pursuing a career in 
music also fell, and so, at the margins, some individuals decided to 
devote their talents elsewhere. 
 The second marginal effect, that existing artists produced more 
music as revenue fell, is not, however, consistent with copyright‘s 
traditional story.98 That existing artists produced more music as rev-
enue fell suggests that, during the 1990s, the returns that copyright 
provided musical were too high. In the study, I suggest that given 
copyright‘s effective scope at that time, our most popular artists were 
receiving an incentive for their music far in excess of their reserva-
tion price. These excess incentives had gotten so high that they were 
pushing our most popular artists onto the backward bending portion 
of the labor supply curve. Finding themselves on the backward-
                                                                                                                  
 97. For the New Artists from 2005, it covers only the first nine calendar years of 
their careers.  
 98. One could suggest that given the decline in new artists, it was inevitable that 
preexisting artists would fill the available spaces, but that fundamentally misunderstands 
the Billboard Hot 100. The chart does not guarantee space to a certain number of new 
songs each year. Rather, a new song can earn a place on the Hot 100 only if it is more popu-
lar than, and hence can displace, existing songs on the chart.  
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bending portion of the labor supply curve, our most popular artists 
chose to substitute leisure for work, and so produced less music.  
 As file sharing became an option, it sharply reduced these excess 
incentives. With the rise of file sharing, revenues for creating and 
disseminating any given song fell.99 As a result, fewer artists found 
themselves on the backward portion of the labor supply curve, and so 
each new artist produced, on average, more hit songs, than each new 
artist did when revenues were high. In short, when revenues from 
music sales fell with the rise of file sharing, those individuals who 
decided to devote their talents to music began to produce more of it. 
 We can see this not only in the regression results, but in the data 
itself. From 1985 through 1999, a fifteen-year period, the top new 
artists were Sean Combs, who appeared on twenty-four different Top 
50 songs in the first ten calendar years of his career; Mariah Carey, 
who had twenty such appearances; and Whitney Houston, who also 
had twenty such appearances. In contrast, with the rise of file shar-
ing and the fall in revenue from record sales, from 2000 through 
2006, the top new artists were Rihanna, who had thirty-five such ap-
pearances in the first nine years of her career; Taylor Swift, who had 
twenty-nine such appearances in the first eight years of her career; 
Ludacris, who had twenty-nine such appearances in the first ten 
years of his career; Akon who had twenty-six such appearances; and 
50 Cent, who had twenty-four such appearances. In other words, in 
just seven years during the low revenue era of file sharing, we had 
five new artists who each had as many or more Top 50 appearances 
than the top new artist from the preceding fifteen, high revenue 
years. The regression results establish that this is not a coincidence 
or random chance. There was a statistically significant correlation 
between higher revenue from music shipments and fewer hits by 
each new artist.  
 Although counterintuitive, this result is entirely consistent with 
the backward-bending labor supply curve that economic theory pre-
                                                                                                                  
 99. This is most readily seen in the declining sales level achieved by the most popular 
album each year. According to Billboard magazine, the most popular album in 1994 was 
Billy Ray Cyrus‘s Some Gave All. Keith Caulfield, Justin Timberlake‟s „20/20‟ 2013‟s Best 
Selling Album, „Blurred Lines‟ Top Song, BILLBOARD (Jan. 2, 2014, 6:49 PM), 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5855151/justin-timberlakes-2020-2013s-best-selling 
-album-blurred-lines-top-song. It sold 4.83 million copies. Id. From there, sales of the top 
album rose fairly steadily and reached a peak in 2000 with ‗N Sync‘s No Strings Attached, 
which sold 9.93 million copies. David Basham, Got Charts? Linkin Park, Shaggy, „NSYNC 
Are 2001‟s Top-Sellers, MTV (Jan. 4, 2002), http://www.mtv.com/news/1451664/got-charts-
linkin-park-shaggy-nsync-are-2001s-top-sellers/. With the rise of file sharing, sales of the 
top album began to fall. Sales fell more or less steadily from 2001 through 2013, reaching a 
nadir in 2013 with Justin Timberlake‘s The 20/20 Experience, which sold only 2.43 million 
copies. Caulfield, supra.  
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dicts and that empirical studies have verified.100 When revenues were 
high, new artists did not have to work as hard to achieve the lifestyle 
they desired, and so they chose at the margins to substitute leisure 
for work. As revenues fell, new artists had to work harder to achieve 
the lifestyle they desired and so, at the margins, they choose to sub-
stitute work for leisure. As a result, as revenues fell, output from 
those new artists increased.  
 Moreover, the case study not only isolated and identified these two 
marginal effects, it used regression analysis to calculate their rela-
tive magnitude precisely. As it turns out, for the period studied, the 
second marginal effect was larger than the first. Any given decline in 
revenue from music shipments had a larger marginal effect on output 
from existing artists than it did on the supply of new artists. As a re-
sult, the decline in the dollar value of music shipments since file shar-
ing began was associated with a net increase in the number of new hit 
songs, holding all else constant.101 We got fewer new artists, but more 
hit songs from the new artists we had. For the music industry, the rise 
of file sharing and the associated decline in revenue thus meant the 
creation of more new hit songs.102 Indeed, file sharing increased music 
output precisely because it decreased music industry revenue.  
 Even though file sharing thus led to both more new music and far 
broader dissemination of existing music, copyright owners have, 
since file sharing began, been begging Congress and the courts to 
wave their magic pens and put a stop it. For the first time, this case 
study allows us to see precisely how music output would have 
changed had their efforts proven successful. If file sharing had been 
                                                                                                                  
 100. ―[O]nly lottery winners experience sudden wealth in a way similar to that of sud-
denly popular authors today. Studies of lottery winners demonstrate that such large 
awards sharply reduce, on average, time worked.‖ Lunney, supra note 9, at 891. As Profes-
sor Gregory Mankiw has summarized: 
The results from studies of lottery winners are striking. Of those winners who 
win more than $50,000, almost 25 percent quit working within a year, and an-
other 9 percent reduce the number of hours they work. Of those winners who 
win more than $1 million, almost 40 percent stop working. The income effect on 
labor supply of winning such a large prize is substantial. 
N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 483 (2d ed. 2000). 
 101. See Lunney, supra note 7, at 25 (―The New Song regression estimates that a one 
million dollar decline in record sales was associated with a 0.00466 increase in the number 
of new songs appearing in the study‘s sample of the top fifty on an annual basis, holding all 
else constant. If we multiply this coefficient by a $13 billion decline in record sales, the 
regression results would estimate that this decline would be associated with 60.6 addition-
al new songs entering the study‘s sample of the top fifty on an annual basis.‖). 
 102. For similar results using other measures of music quality, see Joel Waldfogel, And 
the Bands Played On: Digital Disintermediation and the Quality of New Recorded Music 
(Carlson Sch. of Mgmt. and Dep‘t of Econ., Preliminary Draft, 2012), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2117372, and also see Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, supra 
note 91, at 20 (noting that book publishing, movie production, and music output have all 
risen substantially since file sharing began).  
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it was generating incentives for our most popular artists so far in ex-
cess of their reservation price that we were, perversely, getting less 
music from them. Had the record industry‘s efforts to stop file shar-
ing proven successful, we would have continued vastly overpaying 
our most popular artists for their music. And had we continued to 
overpay them, our most popular artists would have shown their ap-
preciation by giving us fewer hit songs in return. The net result: Had 
revenues remained high, fewer new hit songs would have been pro-
duced over the last ten years.  
 File sharing provided a necessary and desirable corrective. By al-
lowing consumers to copy and distribute original music freely, out-
side the restrictive strictures of copyright, the rise of file sharing 
helped reduce the extent to which copyright was overprotecting orig-
inal works. By reducing the effective level of protection copyright 
provided, file sharing reduced the excess incentives for creating new 
music copyright would otherwise have provided. By reducing these 
excess incentives, file sharing led to the production of more hit songs.  
 Copyright‘s fundamental premise that more revenue equals more 
works is thus not always true. While some copyright may generate 
more original works, too much copyright and too much revenue can 
lead to fewer works, as the regression results establish was happen-
ing in the music industry before the rise of file sharing. Under copy-
right‘s traditional and constitutionally sanctioned justification, there 
thus appears no plausible basis for broadening copyright in an at-
tempt to control file sharing, at least, for music. Given how broad 
copyright is today, broadening copyright even further will not lead to 
more and better works, but instead will lead to fewer and worse. 
That helps to explain why proponents of broader copyright have 
rushed to embrace other arguments, such as increased employment, 
to support their demands for broader copyright. In the next section, 
we turn to this alternative argument and attempt to answer the 
question of whether increasing revenues to and jobs in the copyright 
industries can provide an alternative justification for broader copy-
right. As we do, we must take care to evaluate the argument on its 
own merits and not allow copyright‘s traditional justification to color 
our thinking. We will therefore assume, consistent with the results 
from my case study of file sharing and music output, that any in-
crease in revenue to the copyright industries will not lead to in-
creased creative output.105  
                                                                                                                  
 105. Even if you are reluctant to embrace the results of my case study, it remains 
worthwhile to determine whether the jobs argument can support broader copyright inde-
pendently of copyright‘s traditional more or better works storyline.  
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IV.   IN THE ABSENCE OF MORE OR BETTER WORKS,  
CAN MORE JOBS ALONE JUSTIFY BROADER COPYRIGHT? 
 If broader copyright does not lead to more or better works of au-
thorship, and it may in fact lead to fewer, as the evidence suggests, 
then we cannot justify broader copyright by the additional jobs it may 
create. While broader copyright can increase copyright industry rev-
enue, and may thereby lead to more jobs in the copyright industry, it 
does so by redistributing wealth from consumers to the copyright in-
dustry. Such a redistribution generates no net welfare gain on its 
own. It simply takes money from one group and gives the same mon-
ey to another. Indeed, given the transaction and administrative costs 
such a redistribution would entail, any such redistribution necessari-
ly generates a net welfare loss. Moreover, the possibility that such 
additional revenue may generate additional employment in the copy-
right sector also cannot justify such a redistribution. As Frederic 
Bastiat explained more than a century ago, the sort of redistribution 
that broader copyright achieves generates no net stimulus for the 
economy. Any additional jobs broader copyright might create in the 
copyright sector would simply displace employment elsewhere in  
the economy.  
A.   Of Broader Copyright and Broken Windows 
 As discussed in the introduction, the basic thrust of the mercantil-
ist argument for SOPA and PIPA—that these measures will increase 
revenue to and hence jobs in the copyright industries—represents an 
example of Bastiat‘s Broken Window Fallacy.106 Just as a broken 
window may yield additional revenue to glaziers by taking it from 
other sectors of the economy, broader copyright may similarly yield 
additional revenue to copyright owners, but it does so only by taking 
it from other sectors of the economy. While we can readily see and 
account for the additional jobs we hope for in the copyright sector, we 
must also account for the loss in jobs—not so readily seen, but just as 
real—elsewhere. When we do, we find that broader copyright gener-
ates no net stimulus for the economy as a whole.  
 Of course, the broken window analogy is not perfect. Copyright is 
trying to create something of value—new or better works of author-
ship—not break a window. Nonetheless, the need to evaluate the 
trade-off between different uses of scarce resources remains. In his 
essay, Bastiat addressed this point directly in discussing state fund-
ing for the arts.107 Just as supporters of SOPA and PIPA insisted that 
jobs justified congressional action, so too in Bastiat‘s day, supporters 
                                                                                                                  
 106. BASTIAT, supra note 13, at 72. 
 107. Id. at 87.  
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of a proposed government subsidy for theatres in the amount of sixty 
thousand francs also touted jobs as the justification: 
―The economical question, as regards theatres, is comprised in one 
word – labour. . . . The theatres in France, you know, feed and sal-
ary no less than 80,000 workmen of different kinds; painters, ma-
sons, decorators, costumers, architects, &c., which constitute the 
very life and movement of several parts of this capital, and on this 
account they ought to have your sympathies.‖108 
Or 
―The pleasures of Paris are the labour and the consumption of the 
provinces, and the luxuries of the rich are the wages and bread of 
200,000 workmen of every description, who live by the manifold 
industry of the theatres, and who receive from these noble pleas-
ures, which render France illustrious, the sustenance of their lives 
and the necessaries of their families and children. It is to them 
that you will give 60,000 francs.‖109  
 Even if we assume, as Bastiat did, that the entire subsidy went to 
the workers, rather than corrupt government officials,110 and further 
assume, again as Bastiat did, that supporting theatre workers is, at 
some general level, desirable, we still must account for that which is 
not seen. A subsidy after all does not create wealth that was not there 
before. ―Certainly,‖ Bastiat wrote, ―nobody will think of maintaining 
that the legislative vote has caused this sum to be hatched in a ballot-
box; that it is a pure addition made to the national wealth; that but for 
this miraculous vote these 60,000 francs would have been for ever in-
visible and impalpable.‖111 It merely redistributes existing wealth:  
[I]t is clear that the taxpayer, who has contributed one franc, will 
no longer have this franc at his own disposal. It is clear that he 
will be deprived of some gratification to the amount of one franc; 
and that the workman, whoever he may be, who would have re-
ceived it from him for some service, will be deprived of a benefit to 
that amount. Let us not, therefore, be led by a childish illusion into 
believing that the vote of the 60,000 francs may add anything 
whatever to the well-being of the country, and to national labour. 
It displaces enjoyments, it transposes wages – that is all.112 
                                                                                                                  
 108. Id. at 92 (quoting M. Lamartine). 
 109. Id. at 92-93 (quoting M. Lamartine). 
 110. Id. at 93 (―Yes, it is to the workmen of the theatres that a part, at least, of these 
60,000 francs will go; a few bribes, perhaps, may be abstracted on the way. Perhaps, if we 
were to look a little more closely into the matter, we might find that the cake had gone 
another way, and that these workmen were fortunate who had come in for a few crumbs. 
But I will allow, for the sake of argument, that the entire sum does go to the painters, dec-
orators, &e.‖). 
 111. Id. at 93-94. 
 112. Id. at 94.  
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 While Bastiat acknowledged that one might justify this redistribu-
tion by showing that work in a theatre has some value or intrinsic 
merit other labor lacks,113 the supporters of theatre subsidies in Bas-
tiat‘s day, just as the supporters of SOPA and PIPA today, did not 
make that argument.114 They did not suggest that one form of labor 
was intrinsically more valuable than another. Rather, they pretended 
that they could, through government action,115 create additional jobs 
in one sector at no cost to the rest of the economy. This was as wrong 
then as it is today. In both cases, the argument ―mistak[es] a trans-
ferment for a gain.‖116  
 Applied to broader copyright, Bastiat‘s lesson is simple: Broader 
copyright does not create jobs; it simply substitutes jobs in the copy-
right sector for jobs elsewhere. For copyright owners to receive more 
for their works, consumers must pay more. If consumers pay more for 
original works, they will necessarily have less for everything else. An 
extra dollar for copyright owners means a dollar less for everyone 
else. Broadening copyright so that copyright owners earn millions 
more means millions less everywhere else in the economy. Those mil-
lions may generate more jobs in the copyright sector, but they do so 
not by employing resources that would otherwise go unused or wast-
ed. Rather, they do so by taking those resources from elsewhere in 
the economy.  
 If we pursue the question of whether additional jobs in the copy-
right sector might be more valuable than jobs elsewhere, we find our-
selves back at the central question neoclassical welfare economics 
asks: Which is the more valuable use of the available resources? If 
resources are going elsewhere that would be more valuably used to 
create additional original works, then broadening copyright can make 
sense. If they are not, then broadening copyright does not make 
                                                                                                                  
 113. Id. (―Will it be said that for one kind of gratification, and one kind of labour, it 
substitutes more urgent, more moral, more reasonable gratifications and labour?‖). 
 114. Id. (―There is nothing to prove that this latter class [of theatre workers] calls for 
more sympathy than the former [class of non-theatre workers]. M. Lamartine does not say 
that it is so. He himself says, that the labour of the theatres is as fertile, as productive as 
any other (not more so) . . . .‖). 
 115. While it is true that Bastiat, in his essay, focused on direct government subsidies 
for the arts, rather than the indirect subsidies that broader copyright provides, the eco-
nomic consequences of the two are the same. Tom W. Bell, Authors‟ Welfare: Copyright as a 
Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 240-42 (2003); see 
also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1032 (2005) (―If we must fall back on a physical-world analogy for intellectual proper-
ty protection—and I see no reason why we should—treating intellectual property as a form 
of government subsidy is more likely to get people to understand the tradeoffs involved 
than treating it as real property.‖). Whether government raises taxes on other employment 
in order to subsidize the arts directly, or enacts broader copyright so that the prices for 
original works are higher, ―you diminish wages of labourers, drainers, carpenters, black-
smiths, and increase in proportion those of the singers.‖ BASTIAT, supra note 13, at 94. 
 116. BASTIAT, supra note 13, at 95.  
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sense. That broader copyright may generate additional revenue and 
more jobs in the copyright sector adds nothing to the discussion and 
is irrelevant. Indeed, it should be obvious that employing more indi-
viduals in the copyright sector of the economy in order to produce the 
same level and quality of creative output is wasteful. If we are going 
to achieve the same creative output in any event, we might as well 
use fewer employees to reach that output and employ the additional 
individuals at issue more productively elsewhere in the economy.117 
In the next section, we explore in more detail the relationship be-
tween broader copyright, increased copyright owner revenue, and 
welfare. 
B.   Optimal Copyright: Maximizing Welfare 
Versus Maximizing Jobs 
 If we ignore Bastiat‘s lesson and design copyright to maximize 
copyright owner revenue, in the hope that it would maximize em-
ployment in the copyright industries, we will reduce welfare. To see 
this, consider the following simplified general equilibrium model. For 
the model, we will assume a continuum of potential products in a 
two-sector economy. Resources can be devoted either to the produc-
tion of an original work of authorship in one sector of the economy or 
a non-copyrightable product in the other. The initial product in each 
sector generates a social value of one hundred, with the social value 
of each additional product decreasing in a linear fashion, on a one-
for-one basis. Thus, the second product has a social value of ninety-
nine, the third ninety-eight, and so on. We have one hundred units of 
a resource available that can be used to create either one product in 
the copyright sector or one product in the non-copyright sector, and 
all resources are fully employed. Thus, the sum of works in the copy-
right sector, n, and the sum of products in the non-copyright sector, 
m, will equal one hundred. In the absence of copyright, an individual 
who authors a new original work in the copyright sector will capture 
some fraction, ɸc, of that product‘s social value. Similarly, an individ-
                                                                                                                  
 117. Consider agriculture as an example. Over the course of the twentieth century, the 
farm population fell from 32.5 million or 31.9 percent of the total U.S. population in 1916 to 
2.9 million or only 1 percent of the U.S. population in 2006. JULIAN M. ALSTON ET AL., 
PERSISTENCE PAYS: U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND THE BENEFITS FROM 
PUBLIC R&D SPENDING 9-11, 16 (2010). Yet, because of technological advances, the value 
added by this much smaller farm workforce grew nearly six-fold from 1929 to 2006, from 
$17 billion to $98 billion (measured in 2000 prices). Id. at 10. It‘s true that these same 
technological advances cost the farm sector millions of jobs. Nevertheless, by releasing 
these workers into the rest of the economy, these technological advances, and their associ-
ated job losses, made possible the tremendous growth that occurred in the economy gener-
ally. U.S. Gross Domestic Product increased thirteen-fold from 1929 to 2006, from $866 
billion to $11.3 trillion. Id. One can scarcely imagine a more foolhardy government policy 
than one that, in the name of protecting jobs, tried to limit these technological advances in 
order to keep one-third of our population employed on farms. 
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ual who creates a new product in the non-copyright sector will cap-
ture some fraction, ɸn, of that product‘s social value. The available 
resources are allocated between the two sectors so that the marginal 
work in the copyright sector and the marginal product in the non-
copyright sector receive the same ―price‖ or return on the resource; 
thus ɸcScn= ɸcSnm, where Scn and Snm are the social value of the mar-
ginal work, n, and the marginal product, m, respectively. We will fur-
ther assume that, in the absence of copyright, an individual captures 
only ten percent of the social value of a new original work, while an 
individual captures twenty percent of the social value of a new non-
copyrightable product.118  
 Given this set-up, we can calculate the revenue captured by the 
copyright sector119 and the social welfare attributable to both sectors 
as we increase the level of copyright protection provided.120 As copy-
right protection increases, it increases the fraction of the value that 
an author or copyright owner captures with respect to a new original 
work from ten percent to one hundred percent. Figure 6 presents the 
results. For welfare, I use the welfare obtained with no copyright as a 
baseline and present the welfare obtained at any given level of copy-
right as a gain or loss relative to the ―no copyright‖ welfare. Welfare 
in the chart thus represents the gain in welfare or the loss in welfare 
for any given level of copyright protection, compared to a world with-
out copyright.  
 
                                                                                                                  
 118. While these fractions are assumptions, I have based them on my own sense for 
their likely values. An innovator or author will capture the full ―value‖ of her work, and 
thus the fraction, ɸ, will equal one only if: (i) the legal rules fully insulate the new product 
from competition; and (ii) perfect price discrimination can be achieved without cost. More 
plausibly, if the legal rules protect a new product from competition for its full economic life 
and the innovator sets a uniform profit-maximizing price for the product against a back-
drop of a downward sloping, linear demand curve, and constant marginal costs, then the 
innovator will capture half of the new product‘s social value, and the fraction will equal 0.5 
or 50 percent. Of the remainder, it will be evenly split between consumer surplus and 
deadweight loss (representing unrealized social value). See Lunney, supra note 9, at 864-
67; Lunney, supra note 24, at 557 n.283. I am estimating the fraction at twenty percent for 
non-copyrighted creative products based largely upon Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner‘s 
work and their conclusion that most new products, whether patented or not, face competi-
tion within four years. Mansfield, Schwartz, & Wagner, supra note 60, at  914 & n.1 (―In 
the bulk of the cases, the new product could have been imitated in 2 years or less even if 
the imitator carried out the project at the most leisurely pace. In practically all cases it 
could be imitated in 3 years or less.‖). I use ten percent as the fraction for copyrighted 
works to acknowledge that works of authorship can generally be copied more easily, more 
quickly, and less expensively than new products elsewhere in the economy. Even if we vary 
these assumptions, the essential insights of the model remain. Both the optimal level of 
copyright at which welfare is maximized and the crossover point at which copyright begins 
to reduce welfare are reached well before copyright owner revenue is maximized.   
 119. Rents or revenue to the copyright sector will equal ɸc*(100n-0.5n^2). 
 120. Total social welfare will equal (100n-0.5n^2)+(100m-0.5m^2). 
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works, we quickly reach a point where the welfare losses from broad-
er copyright are such that we would be better off with no copyright at 
all. In Figure 6, once we have past point (2), copyright has become so 
broad that we would be better off with no copyright at all. At this 
point, copyright is attracting too many resources into the creation of 
additional works and consequently leaving too few resources for the 
rest of the economy. The welfare losses resulting from this inefficient 
allocation of the available resources are just as bad as those created 
by having no copyright at all. Given the assumptions I made to gen-
erate Figure 6, we reach the crossover point in our model when the 
system of legal rights copyright creates would enable copyright own-
ers to capture more than forty percent of the value of their original 
works. To be clear, I do not intend Figure 6 to define the precise point 
at which we reach this ―no copyright is better‖ crossover in the real 
world.122 Rather, the point of Figure 6 is that such a crossover exists 
and we will find ourselves at the crossover point well before copyright 
becomes broad enough to enable copyright owners to capture a work‘s 
full value and also well before copyright becomes broad enough to 
maximize revenue to copyright owners.  
 This brings us to point (3), the point at which copyright maximizes 
revenue to copyright owners. As Figure 6 reflects, revenues to the cop-
yright industries continue to increase over the full range of potential 
copyright protection. As broader copyright enables a copyright owner 
to capture an ever-greater fraction of the value associated with her 
work, revenue to the copyright industries steadily increases. This in-
creased revenue comes from increasing the revenue associated: (i) with 
preexisting works; and (ii) with the additional works that broader cop-
yright brings forth. Thus, if the goal is to maximize copyright industry 
revenue, with the hope thereby of maximizing copyright sector em-
ployment, then the appropriate response is to design copyright so that 
authors capture the full value of their respective works.123  
                                                                                                                  
 122. Whether it does so depends on how accurately its assumptions match the real 
world markets against which the production of original works competes for resources. 
While I find the assumptions to be a reasonably good match for real world markets, others 
might plausibly disagree. We should also note that the welfare calculations in Figure 6 
represent only those welfare gains and losses attributable to resource allocation. I have 
omitted any consideration of the overprotection costs that arise from copyright‘s uniformi-
ty. Had we included those costs as well, the welfare gain associated with any given level of 
copyright would have been reduced and the welfare losses associated with any given level 
of copyright would have been larger. In addition, the model assumes a uniform distribution 
in the additional works that broader copyright brings forth. If, as is more likely, the addi-
tional works exhibit a normal distribution as shown in Figure 1, the welfare losses from 
broader copyright would be higher.  
 123. In the real world, ever-broader protection may not maximize copyright industry 
revenue. As Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer have argued in the patent context, if copyright 
protection becomes sufficiently broad, then it may become difficult to introduce new works 
as they will face too many claims of copyright infringement from earlier works. JAMES 
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 As Figure 6 makes clear, however, designing copyright to maxim-
ize copyright industry revenue and employment does not increase 
welfare; it decreases welfare. In welfare terms, the additional reve-
nue to the copyright industries does not represent a net gain for soci-
ety; it represents mere wealth redistribution from consumers to copy-
right owners. Every additional dollar that flows to the copyright in-
dustries must be taken from consumers (or perhaps, as Bastiat ar-
gued, from other industries). Indeed, given the inevitable administra-
tive and transaction costs broader copyright entails, to put one dollar 
into the hands of copyright owners, we have to take somewhat more 
than a dollar from consumers. This redistribution does not therefore 
represent a welfare gain; instead it represents a welfare loss.  
 It may be that in pursuing the goal of maximizing copyright owner 
revenue, copyright has already become so broad that it is past and 
perhaps well past point (2), the crossover point.124 Yet, whether we 
have already reached the crossover point or not, Figure 6 firmly re-
                                                                                                                  
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 8-11 (2008). 
 124. Some might insist that so long as we cannot tell whether attracting more re-
sources into the production of original works, through broader copyright, represents a more 
valuable or less valuable use of those resources, then economics has nothing useful to say 
about copyright‘s optimal scope. Such a position is wrong. First, given a comparative return 
approach, I think we have pretty good evidence that copyright enables an individual to 
capture a far greater fraction of the value added by a work of authorship than by other 
creative endeavors in our economy. I have presented that evidence here and elsewhere, see 
Lunney, supra note 24, at 606-27, and suggested how we should narrow copyright so that it 
provides a return to authorship sufficient to attract additional resources into the produc-
tion of additional works if and only if that represents the highest valued use of those re-
sources. Second, it may be that I have not persuaded everyone as to the merits of my ap-
proach and some may continue to insist that there is simply no way to prove one way or 
another whether producing more original works represents a more or less valuable use of 
resources than the alternative use to which the resources were otherwise be devoted. But 
even if that were true, our inability to prove whether the creation of more works of author-
ship is a more or less valuable use of the resources than the alternative, that does not lead 
to the conclusion that welfare economics has nothing useful to say. Rather, we must then 
concentrate on those welfare gains or losses that we can prove. We know that copyright 
entails a significant wealth transfer from consumers to copyright owners. To accomplish 
this transfer, copyright enables copyright owners to charge more for their works than they 
otherwise could and thus creates deadweight losses. Copyright also imposes significant 
administrative costs every time a copyright infringement suit is brought and may stifle 
innovation for complementary products, such as distribution platforms. See, e.g., Michael 
A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 891, 936-40, 
949-51 (2012). It also imposes transaction costs, requiring licensing for uses that could 
otherwise be done without permission. Where a licensing agreement can be reached, copy-
right bars some valuable uses of a work that could otherwise occur. From a welfare per-
spective, broader copyright increases welfare only if it leads to more and better works of 
authorship and if those works represent a more valuable use of the resources than the 
alternative uses to which the resources would otherwise be devoted. If this supposed bene-
fit cannot be proven one way or the other, if we could be just as well off with more teachers, 
doctors, or engineers, as we would be with more authors, then we cannot establish that 
copyright offers any welfare gains at all. It imposes only costs. In that case, it becomes 
simple to define copyright‘s optimal scope: None.   
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futes the notion that attempting to maximize revenue to and em-
ployment in the copyright sector represents a sensible policy goal. 
Going beyond point (1), which represents the efficient level of protec-
tion, may increase revenue to and jobs in the copyright industries, 
but it will take that revenue and those jobs from elsewhere in the 
economy. Moreover, once we are past point (1), additional jobs in the 
copyright sector will generate less value than the jobs taken away 
elsewhere in the economy. In short, designing copyright to maximize 
copyright owner revenue will only make us worse off.  
C.   Market Failure in Product Markets and 
Political Markets 
 Unfortunately, there is good reason to believe that copyright today 
is already well past the crossover point and is affirmatively making 
us worse off than we would be with no copyright. That reason is Con-
gress. Just as markets for goods and services will fail to achieve a 
Pareto optimal allocation of resources in predictable circumstances, 
so too will political markets. In a representative democracy, political 
markets fail, inter alia, when the interests of a dispersed interest 
group, such as consumers, and those of a concentrated interest group, 
such as the copyright industries,125 collide. Whether we think of our 
elected representatives as public-minded servants of the people or as 
venal and corrupt crooks merely waiting their turn to be indicted, 
Congress is systematically likely to enact measures that benefit a 
concentrated group at the expense of a dispersed group, even when 
the measures represent nothing more than undesirable rent-seeking.  
 This political failure arises because a concentrated group has a 
significant collective action advantage over a dispersed group in or-
ganizing to influence the course of proposed legislation. For any given 
amount at stake for the group as a whole, the members of a dispersed 
group will have less individually at stake than will the members of a 
concentrated group. Given that becoming involved in a political fight 
entails information and transaction costs, as an individual‘s personal 
stake becomes increasingly small, it becomes increasingly rational to 
remain uninformed and uninvolved. Moreover, because legislation is 
a public good, as a group gets larger and more diverse, individuals 
                                                                                                                  
 125. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1950-52 (1992); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-49 
(3rd ed. 1993) (modeling the theory that condensed groups will succeed against dispersed 
groups); ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 40-41 (1970) (discussing the collective action ad-
vantages that a concentrated group will have over a dispersed group); MANCUR OLSON JR., 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 22-36, 127-
28 (1965) (same). 
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become more likely to rely (or free ride) on the efforts of others.126 In 
contrast, when proposed legislation would impact a smaller and more 
cohesive group,127 each member of the group has a larger individual 
stake in the fight and hence is more likely to become informed and 
involved. Moreover, a smaller group is more likely to have effective 
mechanisms, such as trade associations, to coerce participation by 
each member and to thereby limit free riding.128 
 For these reasons, a concentrated group will have more resources 
available, for a given dollar amount at risk, than will a dispersed 
group.129 In addition, the concentrated group is likely to prove more 
effective in using the resources available to influence the legislature 
than a dispersed group.130 An honest politician, lacking perfect infor-
                                                                                                                  
 126. In other words, political markets for legislation are likely to fail for precisely the 
same reason that ordinary markets fail for public goods.   
 127. Whether a group is concentrated or dispersed depends more on its ―effective size‖ 
than the absolute number of affected individuals. Effective size refers to the fact that cor-
porations, unions, and other well-organized groups count as only one ―effective person,‖ 
even though the corporation may have thousands of employees and shareholders. In addi-
tion, ―effective‖ delineation recognizes that, while the total costs of a measure may be im-
posed on a very large group, the primary cost may fall on a select subgroup. For example, 
air pollution control might impose ninety-five percent of its cost on fifty corporations and 
the remaining five percent on five million individuals with wood-burning fireplaces. De-
termining whether an industry is concentrated presents the same problem: five major cor-
porations may control ninety-five percent of the business with 500 other corporations con-
trolling the remaining five percent. To determine concentration in a market, a court can 
look to the market share of the top four to eight corporations, see George J. Stigler, Free 
Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 359, 362 (1974), or use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, see generally 
Neil B. Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the New Anti-
trust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 453 (1983). Using 
such an approach we can readily see that although broadening copyright implicates copy-
right interests owned by millions of people—since everyone who has ever written a person-
al e-mail is a copyright owner—the effective size of the interest group benefitted by broader 
copyright has, historically, been much smaller than these large numbers suggest because 
most of the benefit falls on the handful of movie studios, publishing houses, and record labels. 
 128. See, e.g., James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Con-
duct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
19-23 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988) (Vol. 6 of POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND PUBLIC POLICY); OLSON, supra note 125, at 22-36, 127-28; William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 286-87 (1988).  
 129. See Lunney, supra note 125, at 1951 (―For a given dollar amount at risk, each 
member of a concentrated group faces a higher individual risk than would a member of a 
dispersed group. In addition, a concentrated group can more easily coerce each of its mem-
bers to participate than can a dispersed group. As a result, each member of a concentrated 
group is more likely to participate in the lobbying effort and less likely to free ride on the 
efforts of others.‖). 
 130. See Lunney, supra note 125, at 1950-51 (―[A concentrated] group can coordinate 
and control its members‘ efforts, achieving economies of scale. The group can avoid duplica-
tion of effort, obtain expert support for its position, and even hire a full-time lobbyist to 
protect its interests. When the legislature requires information on costs or technology with-
in the exclusive control of the members of an interest group, the concentrated group can 
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mation with respect to the desirability of proposed legislation, may 
use the support and opposition that she hears as evidence of the 
measure‘s desirability. But in a fight over broadening copyright, such 
a politician is likely to hear strong support for and little opposition to 
such a measure. This apparent support is not, however, because the 
measure is desirable; rather, it derives from the huge collective ac-
tion advantage the copyright industries enjoy over consumers gener-
ally. For venal politicians, that same collective action advantage 
translates into disproportionate resources for copyright owners to 
buy such politicians and their votes.   
 As a result, Congress is systematically likely to enact legislative 
measures that broaden copyright even when they reduce welfare.131 
As Figure 6 shows, even when broadening copyright would generate 
welfare losses, it continues to increase copyright owner revenue. As 
self-interested actors, copyright owners care about their revenues, 
not about social welfare. We should therefore fully expect copyright 
owners to go to Congress and fight for broader copyright and the as-
sociated increase in their revenue, even if broader copyright gener-
ates welfare losses to society as a whole. Given the market concentra-
tion in the various copyright industries,132 we should expect that lob-
bying effort to be well-funded and effective, which it is. Of course, 
every additional dollar in revenue to copyright owners means a dollar 
(and then some) lost by consumers. But we should not expect con-
sumers to prove effective, generally, in lobbying against broader cop-
yright. Even when broader copyright would transfer hundreds of mil-
lions, even billions, of dollars from consumers to copyright owners, 
each individual consumer has only a few dollars at stake if a given 
proposal to broaden copyright passes. That individual cost will likely 
prove to be insufficient and, indeed, has proven insufficient histori-
cally to persuade many consumers to become personally involved in 
lobbying against broader copyright. 
 The net result of this collective action advantage, consistently 
pressed over the last two hundred years, has been a steady expansion 
of copyright‘s term and scope. Most of this expansion has been unde-
sirable; for the most part, it has represented mere rent-seeking: 
transferring wealth from consumers to copyright owners with no wel-
                                                                                                                  
more easily coordinate the release of the information, arranging the release in a manner 
designed to shape the legislature's perceptions of the merits of a proposed measure.‖). 
 131. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 9, at 895-901. 
 132. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 673, 719 (2003) (noting that ―in the music industry there is the very real prob-
lem of industry concentration‖); Lunney, supra note 9, at 916 & n.325 (citing sources show-
ing that in the movie industry in the year 2000, 70.4% of domestic box office revenue went 
to six studios and that the five record labels in the Napster case had a market share of 
roughly 75%).  
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fare gains. Indeed, much of the expansion has likely generated con-
siderable welfare losses. While undesirable, this expansion has come 
because the collective action advantages of copyright owners have 
tricked Congress (or Congress has allowed itself to be tricked)133 into 
believing that the expansion was desirable. The opposition to PIPA 
and SOPA was successful because it enabled consumers, at least for 
one brief moment, to let Congress know how they truly felt about 
broader copyright. The online petition drive both gave consumers the 
information that they needed to determine whether they wanted to 
oppose the measures and provided a means to express their opposi-
tion. Moreover, it provided consumers with both at a very low cost—a 
cost sufficiently low that it was rational for individual consumers to 
take the time to become involved.  
 Whether the forces that defeated PIPA and SOPA can be convert-
ed into a political movement that will accomplish true copyright re-
form in the United States remains to be seen. While I am not terribly 
optimistic, I am hopeful. Canada recently managed several signifi-
cant steps in the right direction.134 Given the flaws in the political 
process and the resulting likelihood of political failure in this area, it 
is too bad, really, that Thomas Jefferson could not persuade James 
Madison to limit Congress‘s constitutional power in this area to a 
specific term of years.135 Had he done so, copyright would be far less 
overbroad, at least, in terms of duration, than it is today. 
                                                                                                                  
 133. While Congress likely includes a mixture of honest and venal politicians, actions 
that seek to limit the presentation of competing viewpoints or access to other objective 
sources of information regarding a proposed measure‘s desirability, such as Representative 
Smith‘s decision to limit witnesses before proceeding to the mark-up of SOPA and Con-
gress‘s earlier decision to de-fund the Office of Technology Assessment, cf. Pamela Samuel-
son, Book Note, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740 (2013) (recommend-
ing the re-establishment of the OTA), tend to support the view that our elected representa-
tives are predominantly venal.  
 134. At the judicial level, the Canadian Supreme Court has recognized a broader ap-
proach to fair dealing in several recent cases and has also reiterated its position that copy-
right exceptions such as fair dealing should be treated as users‘ rights. See Soc‘y of Com-
posers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. Bell Can., [2012] S.C.R. 326, 327 (Can.) 
(holding that providing thirty-second previews of music to consumers constitutes fair deal-
ing); Alta. (Educ.) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), [2012] 
S.C.R. 345, 349-52 (Can.) (holding that the copying of short excerpts from complementary 
texts by teachers constitutes fair dealing). In its recent statutory reform, Canada also lim-
ited the availability of statutory damages for non-commercial purposes. Copyright Modern-
ization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, cl. 46 (Can.) (limiting statutory damages in cases involving 
infringement(s) for non-commercial purposes to a maximum of $5,000 (Canadian) for all 
infringements in a single proceeding for all works).  
 135. In response to James Madison‘s proposal to limit Congress‘s power in this area 
―for limited times,‖ Jefferson responded: 
I like it as far as it goes; but I should have been for going further. For instance 
the following alterations and additions would have pleased me. . . . Art. 9. Mo-
nopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature and 
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 Perhaps rather than copyright reform, it is time for our own Stat-
ute of Monopolies moment. In 1624, the English Parliament rose up 
and rejected the English Crown‘s practice of bestowing the exclusive 
right to manufacture, import, or sell various commodities on one 
court favorite or another.136 As with copyright, royal patents in the 
16th and 17th centuries initially served a public purpose and were 
granted to help ensure the introduction of new trades into Britain. 
Over time, however, they became undesirable monopolies granted ―as 
rewards for political patronage.‖137 To restrain the Crown‘s power and 
to ensure that it served a public purpose, the English Parliament en-
acted the Statute of Monopolies.138  
 Perhaps, it is time for ―We the People‖ to rise up and deprive Con-
gress of the power to provide exclusive rights in works of authorship. 
Thomas Jefferson believed that we could and would take such action 
should it prove necessary. As he wrote to Madison in discussing the 
need for limits on Congress‘s power to grant exclusive rights to au-
thors and inventors: ―These restrictions I think are so guarded as to 
hinder evil only. However if we do not have them now, I have so 
much confidence in my countrymen as to be satisfied that we shall 
have them as soon as the degeneracy of our government shall render 
them necessary.‖139   
 The degeneracy of our government on the issue of copyright has 
become increasingly apparent. The only real question at this point is 
whether we will prove ourselves worthy of Jefferson‘s faith.  
 While I recognize the political difficulty and perhaps futility of 
proposing a constitutional amendment limiting Congress‘s power in 
this area, I think it is both the time and past the time to put such 
options on the table. It has been over two hundred years since our 
                                                                                                                  
their own inventions in the arts for a term not exceeding —— years but for no 
longer term and no other purpose. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 364, 367-68 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1958) [hereinaf-
ter Letter from Jefferson to Madison].  
 136. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac, c. 3 (Eng.). For commentary on the Statute of 
Monopolies, see Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 909 (2002).  
 137. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 
1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1265 (2001); see also Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 
1040, 1042-43 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) (No. 13,957) (Van Ness, District Judge) (―[T]hese perni-
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beth lavished them, with a munificent hand, upon her courtiers and her servants, whether 
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whether foreign or domestic, was appropriated by monopolists.‖). 
 138. See Mossoff, supra note 137, at 1270-73; see also Ochoa & Rose, supra note 136, at 
913 (discussing the Statute of Monopolies and its exceptions). 
 139. Letter from Jefferson to Madison, supra note 136, at 368. 
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Constitution was written, and we have a much better sense today for 
where representative democracy works and where it fails. Because 
copyright benefits a concentrated and well-organized interest group 
at the expense of a dispersed group, establishing an optimal copy-
right regime is simply not something Congress has done or will do 
well. We should therefore limit Congress‘s power to act on this issue. 
At the simplest, such a constitutional amendment might follow Jef-
ferson‘s suggestion and substitute ―for no more than fourteen years‖ 
for the phrase ―for limited times‖ in Article I, section 8, clause 8. Tak-
ing it a step further, an amendment might specify or limit the nature 
of the ―exclusive rights‖ that Congress may grant. I fully recognize 
that such an approach would enshrine a set of rights that, even if op-
timal today, may not prove optimal for all time. Such an approach 
would almost certainly impose a set of legal rights that will not per-
fectly fit the needs of the future, as technology and markets change. 
Nevertheless, I believe that such an approach remains preferable to 
our current approach. Any welfare losses that may result from con-
stitutionalizing today‘s optimal set of rights and imposing those 
rights onto the future would be less than the welfare losses that will 
result and have resulted from leaving the issue to Congress. Given 
how overbroad copyright has become, even an amendment barring 
Congress (and the states as well) from granting exclusive rights to 
authors for their writings altogether would likely be better than 
where we find ourselves today. 
 In the end, the question is not whether the market for original 
works will, if left to itself, achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of re-
sources. Very few markets work perfectly. If we had no copyright and 
essentially left the market to its own devices, there will undoubtedly 
be some instances where resources flow to other uses even though 
creating an additional original work represents the most valuable use 
of those resources. Even so, the real question is not whether some 
degree of market failure will otherwise occur, but whether Congress 
can improve on the market‘s outcome, given the likelihood of political 
failure on this issue. Given how well music output has held up in the 
face of widespread file sharing and given the excesses of today‘s copy-
right law, we have far more to fear from congressional action than we 
do from leaving the market for original works alone.  
 V.   CONCLUSION 
 As a test case of our brave new digital world, the music industry‘s 
experience suggests that we can have both widespread consumer 
copying and sufficient incentives to produce new original work. Ra-
ther than decrease in the face of widespread consumer copying, out-
put in the music industry, both in terms of quantity and quality, has 
increased and by some measures has increased sharply. If copyright‘s 
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purpose is indeed a public one, ―to promote the Progress of Science,‖ 
then the fact of increased copyright output would seem to fully rebut 
any need for increased copyright protection.  
 Yet copyright owners insist that they need more copyright. Rather 
than argue that widespread consumer copying is leading to fewer 
original works—because it is not—copyright owners have argued in-
stead that more protection means more revenue for copyright owners 
and hence more jobs in the copyright sector.140 Even if true, this ar-
gument provides no basis for legislative action. As Bastiat long ago 
explained, government action that increases revenue to one sector of 
the economy necessarily reduces revenue to every other sector of the 
economy. Whether this is done through a direct tax-and-subsidy 
scheme or through an indirect subsidy such as copyright, the result is 
the same. If broader copyright means more revenue and more jobs in 
the copyright sector, it necessarily means less revenue and hence 
fewer jobs everywhere else.  
 For that reason, the jobs argument cannot justify broader copy-
right. While the public good character of original works and the ease 
with which they can otherwise be copied may justify some level of 
copyright protection, they justify only that level of protection needed 
to enable individuals to recover a fraction of their respective work‘s 
value both comparable to and neither higher nor lower than that re-
coverable for creative work elsewhere in the economy. As a practical 
matter, ensuring such equality requires only a very limited degree of 
copyright protection—something akin to the fourteen years of protec-
tion against mechanical duplication by competing commercial pub-
lishers that the 1790 Copyright Act provided. 141 
 The widespread consumer copying that digital technology and the 
Internet have made possible are a recent phenomenon. While we still 
do not know all of the ways in which digital technology will impact 
the creation and distribution of new original works, both economic 
theory and empirical data to date suggest that consumer copying, 
even if widespread, does not pose a threat to copyright‘s constitution-
al delimitation of promoting the ―Progress of Science.‖ Consumer 
copying, including unauthorized file sharing, increases access to and 
the value of original works directly.142 While it may reduce copyright 
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owner revenue, the music industry‘s experience suggests that, even 
with widespread consumer copying, we will still have incentives that 
are sufficient and, perhaps more than sufficient, to ensure the crea-
tion and dissemination of new original works.  
 To be sure, it may turn out that the music industry‘s experience 
will not prove representative.143 In other fields, in the face of wide-
spread consumer copying, we may see actual reductions in creative 
output. But it will be soon enough to act when creative output actual-
ly falls. That consumer copying has led to falling revenue and per-
haps reduced employment for particular copyright industries does 
not and cannot justify expanding copyright. If we pretend otherwise 
and, in doing so, increase copyright protection in an attempt to max-
imize copyright owner revenue and, perhaps, copyright industry em-
ployment, we will only be left worse off. 
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